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REGULATION OF CANADIAN CAPITAL MARKETS
IN THE 1990s: THE UNITED STATES
IN THE DRIVER'S SEAT
Cally Jordant
Abstract: This Article looks at the regulatory techniques that have been adopted in
a small but developed market, Canada, in response to the increasing integration of the
North American economy and internationalization of capital markets. One of the most
comprehensive experiments has been the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System (MJDS)
implemented in Canada and the United States in 199 1. Based on principles of reciprocal
recognition, the MJDS has in fact created greater pressures for harmonization of the two
regulatory regimes and, on the Canadian side, prompted regulatory innovations which
have attempted to keep Canadian markets in the global game.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The last few years have seen a quiet upheaval on the regulatory scene
with respect to issuers and capital markets in Canada. The Canadian regula-
tory regime, particularly that of Ontario, its principal jurisdiction, has been
t Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, McGill University; of Counsel, Goodman Phillips &
Vineberg, Hong Kong; D.E.A. (Universitd de Paris I); LL.B./B.C.L. (McGill); M.A. (Toronto); B.A.
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shaken to its roots. Several inexorable forces have been at work, among
them the increasing economic integration of North America (most strikingly
observed in its capital markets) and the dramatic internationalization of
capital markets.
The case of Canada is an interesting one. It is a small but highly
developed capital market, I with a securities regulatory regime which is
innovative in many respects, and which still shows traces of British influ-
ences, but is now inextricably caught in the gears of the U.S. Securities and
Exchange Commission ("SEC") machinery.
To add to the complexity of the situation, and never far from the
surface in Canadian affairs, is the constitutional issue: the regulatory struc-
ture is the object of competing jurisdictional claims between the federal and
provincial governments. This is the unfortunate legacy of certain Privy
Council decisions in the 1930s 2 which fostered a characterization of
In 1994, the TSE was the 7th largest trading market in the world, with a domestic share market
capitalization ofC$315,054.0 million. In 1993, the TSE's market capitalization was C$325,246.8 million,
which placed it 8th worldwide. FIBV Pairs Annual Statistical Report.
2 For example, in Lymburn v. Mayland, A.C. 318 (P.C. 1932), the Privy Council upheld an Alberta
statute which provided that no person may trade in securities unless registered with the Attorney-General.
The Privy Council held that the statute was not invalid in relation to Dominion [federal] companies, as it
did not wholly preclude them from selling shares unless they were registered, but merely subjected them to
provisions applying to all persons trading in securities. Previous Privy Council cases had held that
securities regulation was within the jurisdiction of the provincial legislature, but only where the provincial
legislation did not preclude a Dominion company from operating anywhere in the country. See, e.g., A.G.
Manitoba v. A.G. Canada, I W.W.R. 136, 1 D.L.R. 369 (P.C. 1929).
Provincial securities law has been upheld where there is some overlapping, but no conflict, with
federal law. See Multiple Access v. McCutcheon, 2 S.C.R. 161, 138 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (1982). However,
Dickson, J, left the door open for the creation of a federal securities regulatory scheme when he stated at
pages 173-74:
Parliament has not yet enacted any comprehensive scheme of securities legislation. To date
the Canadian experience has been that the provinces have taken control of the marketing of
securities, differing in this respect from the United States where the Securities and Exchange
Commission has regulated trading and primary distribution of securities. I should not wish by
anything said in this case to affect prejudicially the constitutional right of Parliament to enact a
general scheme of securities legislation pursuant to its power to make laws in relation to
interprovincial and export trade and commerce. This is of particular significance considering
the interprovincial and indeed international character of the securities industry. The federal
government, it may be noted, has already produced Proposals for a Securities Market Law for
Canada (1979). Professor Anisman, writing in 1981 in respect of those proposals expressed the
view that:
[Tlhe factors that indicated a need for federal regulatory involvement in the securities
market in 1979 are still present and, if anything, have been reinforced by events
during the past two years. The Proposals are premised ultimately on the national and
international character of the Canadian securities market and its importance to the
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securities regulation as essentially a "local" matter, an anomalous view in
an era of rapid internationalization of capital markets.
II. BACKGROUND TO CANADIAN SECURITIES REGULATION
Unlike the United States, there is no federal or national securities
commission in Canada. The impediments to a national commission have
been political rather than constitutional. 3 Since its emergence, securities
regulation has been the preserve of the provincial governments; the federal
government has left the field open to them. Although the federal govern-
ment commissioned a report which appeared in 1978 with respect to federal
regulation of securities matters,4 no action was taken, the federal govern-
ment seemingly content to exercise its exclusive power over banking.
There are thus twelve separate securities commissions or regulatory
authorities, each charged with supervision of their local markets. The
province of Ontario, with the lion's share of market activity and home to the
Toronto Stock Exchange, is the acknowledged principal market and the
Ontario Securities Commission its regulator. 5
economic welfare of the country. The fact that the market is national in scope has
long been acknowledged and is demonstrated by the cooperative efforts of the
provincial commissions with respect to the adoption of national policies and by the
statutory authorization for and increasing frequency of joint hearings held by a
number of provincial commissions to decide issues that transcend provincial
boundaries.
(The Proposals for a Securities Market Law for Canada: Purpose and Process, 19
Osgoode Hall L.J. 329, 352 (1981), footnotes omitted).
Multiple Access, 2 S.C.R. at 173-74.
For a detailed discussion of the division of powers in securities issues, see P. Anisman & P.W. Hogg,
Constitutional Aspects of Federal Securities Legislation, in 3 PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW
FOR CANADA 135-220 (1979).
3 Multiple Access v. McCutcheon, 2 S.C.R. 161, 138 D.L.R. (3d) I (1982).
4 PROPOSALS FOR A SECURITIES MARKET LAW FOR CANADA (Canada, Minister of Consumer and
Corporate Affairs 1979). Part I of the Draft Act states that its purpose is to achieve the goals of the
efficient and honest functioning of the Canadian capital market by:
ensuring the availability of information relating to investment decisions, by protecting investors
from fraudulent and deceptive conduct and by ensuring fair competition, all of which can best
be accomplished by the creation of an independent public body to regulate the Canadian
securities market and securities market actors over which the Parliament of Canada has
legislative jurisdiction in cooperation with similar provincial and foreign public authorities.
Id.
5 For this reason, this paper will focus on the Ontario regime.
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The inefficiencies created by regulatory duplication in a small market
have long been recognized and various measures have been taken to address
them. With the exception of the province of Qu6bec, 6 securities acts and
regulations in the provinces are harmonized to a large degree, the Ontario
Securities Act 7 having served as the original model.8
Given the rapidity of change and volatility in markets in the last few
years, less and less recourse has been had to reliance on the Ontario statute
and its regulations to ensure market oversight. Legislative change cannot
keep up with the market. For this reason, the role of an ad hoc group of
provincial regulators, the Canadian Securities Administrators ("CSA"), has
become increasingly important, in effect acting as a substitute for a national
securities commission. 9 Although not endowed with any legislative author-
ity, the CSA meets regularly and acts as a coordinating body for regulatory
initiatives, most notably in the formulation of "National Policy Statements"
adopted (or, more rarely and more recently, not adopted) by each provincial
commission.10
For many years a precarious balance was maintained, with the
industry and legal profession tacitly and conveniently overlooking the lack
of legislative authority of the CSA and its National Policy Statements in
regulating the market. In the absence of any other mechanism, National
Policy Statements filled the bill admirably, providing, for example, the
procedures for coordination of prospectus filing across Canada."H
6 The substance of the regulatory regime of Qu6bec is very similar to that of other provinces
although the actual statutory format is different. For a brief summary of Qudbec law, see Luc LaRochelle
et al., Bill 85, Qudbec's New Security Act, 29 MCGILL L.J. 88, 92-94 (1983).
7 Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. ch. S.5 (1990), as amended by S.O. ch. 18, § 56 (1992); S.O. ch. 27
(1993); and S.O. ch. 11 (1994) [hereinafter OSA]. With time, regional divergences have crept in.
8 See M. GILLEN, SECURITIES REGULATION IN CANADA 60 (1992).
9 Id. at 61.
10 Id at61.
11 For example, National Policy Statement No. I establishes the procedures to be followed when.
documents are to be cleared in more than one jurisdiction. National Policy Statement No. 1, reprinted in
Consolidated Ontario Securities Act and Regulations 1995 at 447-78 [hereinafter OSA and Regulations
1995]. These procedures were agreed upon by the various securities regulatory authorities in order to
facilitate the acceptance of a prospectus, a short form prospectus or an initial annual information form in
more than one Canadian jurisdiction; National Policy Statement No. 27 sets out the accounting principles to
be applied to. and the disclosure to be included in, the financial statements of an issuer. Id. at 499-501.
National Policy Statement No. 39 regulates various aspects of mutual funds. Id. at 575-624. National
Policy Statement No. 40 requires timely disclosure and filing of material information. Id. at 624-31.
National Policy Statement No. 41 provides a framework to ensure that materials relating to meetings of
security holders, including proxies and audited annual financial statements, will be provided to non-
registered holders of securities of reporting issuers. Id. at 631-48. National Policy Statement No. 44 lists
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This happy situation, however, could not long resist the dramatic
changes provoked by the forces of North American economic integration
and the internationalization of capital markets. The first significant event
was the introduction of universal bankingl 2 to Canada, which occurred at
the same time that provincial restrictions on foreign ownership of the secu-
rities industry were relaxed. 13 This is commonly referred to as the Canadian
"little bang" of 1987.14 The introduction of universal banking in Canada,
like the metric system, was very much a response to world trends (still
resisted in the United States).' 5
Domestically, however, the effect was to rekindle federal interest in
the regulation of securities matters. Canadian banking is dominated by a
handful of large, well-capitalized institutions which are subject to federal
regulation and operate nationwide with an extensive branch network. 1
6
Once the regulatory hurdles were removed in 1987, the large Canadian
banks quickly snapped up the much smaller investment dealers which con-
tinued to operate through separately incorporated subsidiaries but now
under bank ownership. 17  Suddenly, the banks were in the securities
business and a regulatory tussle ensued, primarily between the Ontario
provincial and federal governments, regarding who would regulate which
aspects of the overall operations. 18
the rules for shelf prospectus offerings and for pricing offerings after the final prospectus is receipted. Id.
at 650-81.
12 The term "universal banking" usually refers to financial institutions combining retail banking and
securities dealing activities.
13 See Cally Jordan, Canadian Financial Services-The New Broom, 18:3 FINANCIAL SERVICES
REGULATION 177 (Oct. 21, 1987).
14 The allusion, obviously, is to the Big Bang of 1986 in the London markets. There is, in fact, very
little similarity to the reforms actually effected in Canada and the United Kingdom at that time. See id. at
177.
15 The new Republican Congress in the United States has said that it will put consideration of the
Glass-Steagall Act, which separates retail banking from securities activities, at the top of its financial
services agenda. See A.R. Karr, Economy: Leach to Offer Bill to Revamp Bank Oversight, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 12, 1994, at A2; D. Rogers, Politics & Policy: GOP's Leaders in House to Act on Bank Reforms,
WALL ST. J., Dec. 1, 1994, at A20; P.P. Swire, Bank on Streamlined Regulation, WALL ST. J., Nov. 21,
1994, at A 16; J. Taylor & A.R. Karr, Bank-law Overhaul, Not Whitewater, to be House Panel Priority,
Leach Says, WALL ST. J., Nov. 16, 1994, at C 19.
16 See Jordan, supra note 13.
17 Id
Is Id The regulatory confusion led to the establishment of the Hockin-Kwinter Accord, an
intergovernmental agreement between Tom Hockin, then Federal Minister of State (Finance) and Monte
Kwinter, then Minister of Financial Institutions for the Province of Ontario, in respect to the
implementation of their respective regimes for the regulation of securities-related activities of federal
financial institutions and their subsidiaries or affiliates. The accord enumerated specific securities-related
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
The effect of a direct federal interest in the bank-owned investment
dealers, combined with increasing North American and other international
pressures on participation in the Canadian financial services and capital
markets, forced the idea of a national securities commission to bob again to
the surface. As Canadian and U.S. regulators found themselves increasingly
thrown together into negotiations in an attempt to deal with the repercus-
sions of an integrated North American capital market, the disadvantages of
the diffuse Canadian regime became glaringly apparent; a motley collection
of Canadian regulators found themselves negotiating nose to nose with one
of the world's most powerful centralized governmental agencies, the SEC.
In addition, competition between capital markets had intensified with
the rise of Tokyo, Hong Kong, and the Euromarkets in the 1980s, and the
regulatory duplication in Canada came to be viewed as a competitive disad-
vantage. In the wave of privatizations and global issuances, the small
Canadian market with its multiplicity of regulations and regulators was not
worth the effort of compliance. The Canadian markets risked being left out
in the cold.
Another factor contributing to the perceived need for nationalizing
the securities regulatory system in Canada was the evolving nature of the
financial markets themselves. Volatility, a proliferation of new and
complex financial products, the sudden interdependence of markets around
the world, all these factors called for a regulatory deftness and nimbleness
that the cumbersome Canadian system, with its many regulators, large and
small, could not provide. The cozy informality of the Canadian regulatory
style, issues being resolved through moral suasion in a fairly leisurely
fashion as they arose, could also not withstand the intrusion of aggressive
new market players and practices.
The need for a national securities commission in Canada to address
these issues is widely, if sometimes only covertly, acknowledged. The
latest attempt, which only recently derailed, was initiated in December
1993. Interestingly enough, the pressure for a national commission came
from several of the smaller provincial governments which, in a remarkable
show of pragmatism, were willing to get out of the securities regulation
business.19
activities, setting out the respective jurisdictions of the federal Office of the Superintendent of Financial
Institutions and the Ontario Securities Commission. The accord was released April 28, 1987.
19 Brenda Dalglish, Trading Places: A National Securities Commission Takes Shape, MACLEANS,
Apr. 4, 1994, at B38.
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The opportunity to create a national securities commission was
virtually handed on a platter to the federal government. Whether the politi-
cal winds shifted too quickly for the national commission to be realized or
whether the opportunity was simply wasted is unclear. Although the federal
government has clear constitutional authority to legislate,20 it chose instead
to propose a clumsy provincial to federal delegation of power embodied in
an administrative understanding. 21
The ball is now back in the provincial court with some perhaps
unintended consequences. In the absence of a national commission, the
importance and stature of the CSA is amplified. Ironically, provinces such
as Quebec and British Columbia, which may have demonstrated resistance
to a national commission in an attempt to preserve provincial turf, may find
that they have less and less turf to protect. Centripetal market forces will
tend inevitably to result in one market and one regulator: Ontario. 22
There is no doubt that the provinces, through the CSA, are valiantly
trying to compensate for legislative inaction at the federal level. Recent
CSA initiatives have included an "expedited review" procedure designed to
simplify and speed up provincial prospectus filings (primarily by applying
principles of reciprocal recognition among provinces). 23 In addition, a Task
Force on Operational Efficiencies in the Administration of Securities
Regulation has been created by the CSA and recently presented its interim
report.24 The task force is looking to "further operational streamlining" so
as to ease the "paper burden" and permit quicker access to capital markets.25
Technological advances such as electronic filing and reciprocal recognition
among the provinces will undoubtedly help to promote, in fact, if not in law,
one capital market in Canada.
20 Multiple Access v. McCutcheon, 2 S.C.R. 161, 138 D.L.R. (3d) 1 (1982).
21 Memorandum of Understanding Regarding the Regulation of Securities In Canada, 17 O.S.C.B.
4401 (Sept. 16, 1994).
22 The president of the Montreal Exchange, Gerald Lacoste, is trying to boost the Montreal
Exchange market share by fostering trading in specialized products with international appeal. In 1994,
Montreal's share of equities trading in Canada in dollar terms fell by 7% to 14.6%, compared with 16.2%
in 1993. By comparison, the TSE share rose from 78% in 1993, to 81.8% in 1994. See K. Dougherty, Will
the ME find PEACE?, FIN. POST(Toronto), Jan. 1I, 1995, at S2-85.
23 Expedited Review of Short Form Prospectuses and Renewal AIFs, 17 O.S.C.B. 5210 (Nov. 4,
1994).
24 Task Force on Operational Efficiencies in the Administration of Securities Regulation Interim
Report, 18 O.S.C.B. 235 (Jan. 20, 1995).
25 Id
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III. DISCLOSURE IN CANADA: REGULATORY TECHNIQUES IN A CHANGING
WORLD
A. Basic Principles
Anyone familiar with securities regulation in the United States would
have little difficulty recognizing the same principles operating in Canada.
Prospectus and continuous disclosure requirements, insider trading rules,
and takeover bid regimes are all very comparable. The regulations are
detailed and technical with great emphasis on compliance with a highly
formalistic construct. The Canadian and U.S. regimes are close cousins and
speak the same language.
There are differences in approach, however, which is the result of a
distinct legislative development and a different regulatory tradition. The
Canadian provincial securities statutes were enacted in the wake of the
landmark U.S. legislation of the 1930s, the Securities Act of 1933 (the 1933
Act) and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the 1934 Act).26 The
Canadian statutes were able to benefit from the U.S. experience; that, com-
bined with the then still strong British legislative drafting tradition, resulted
in simpler, more modem legislation. One only has to read section 5 of the
1933 Act 27 together with the comparable prospectus delivery section in the
26 Securities Act of 1933, 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a-77aa (1988) (as amended); Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a-78ij (1976) (as amended).
27 Section 5 of the 1933 Act, entitled "Prohibitions Relating to Interstate Commerce and the Mails,"
provides the following:
(a) Unless a registration statement is in effect as to a security, it shall be unlawful for any
person, directly or indirectly-
(I) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to sell such security through the use or medium of any
prospectus or otherwise; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce, by any means
or instruments of transportation, any such security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after
sale.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly-
(I) to make use of any means or instruments of transportation or communication in
interstate commerce or of the mails to carry or transmit any prospectus relating to any security
with respect to which a registration statement has been filed under this title, unless such
prospectus meets the requirements of section 10; or
(2) to carry or cause to be carried through the mails or in interstate commerce any such
security for the purpose of sale or for delivery after sale, unless accompanied or preceded by a
prospectus that meets the requirements of subsection (a) of section 10.
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Ontario Securities Act 28 to appreciate the difference in legislative approach.
In the Qudbec Securities Act,29 the application of civil law drafting princi-
ples to U.S. securities regulation has had even more startling transformative
effects.30 Although both the Ontario and Quebec securities statutes are
showing their age (the former dating from 1978 and the latter, 1982), they
still represent a fairly modem distillation of North American principles of
securities regulation.
The major difference between the U.S. and Canadian regulatory
regimes lies in the treatment of transactions exempt from prospectus filing
and delivery requirements. The Canadian commissions, unlike the SEC,
have a general exemptive power which can dispense with the prospectus
requirement where it is not prejudicial to the public interest.3 1 Moreover, a
(c) It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly to make use of any means or
instruments of transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the mails to offer to
sell or offer to buy through the use or medium of any prospectus or otherwise any security,
unless a registration statement has been filed as to such security, or while the registration
statement is the subject of a refusal order or stop order or (prior to the effective date of the
registration statement) any public proceeding or examination under section 8.
15 U.S.C. §77e (1988).
28 Section 53 of the Ontario Securities Act, R.S.O. ch. S-5 (1990) provides:
(1) No person or company shall trade in a security on his, her or its own account or on behalf of
any other person or company, where such trade would be a distribution of such security, unless a
preliminary prospectus and a prospectus have been filed and receipts therefore obtained from the
Director.
(2) A preliminary prospectus and a prospectus may be filed in accordance with this Part to
enable the issuer to become a reporting issuer, despite the fact that no distribution is
contemplated.
OSA, K.S.O. § 53 (1990).
29 Quebec Securities Act, R.S.Q. ch. V- I(1977) (as amended).
30 The Quebec Securities Act is remarkably simple in its structure and, in the civil law tradition, its
provisions state general principles rather than technical detail.
31 Section 74 of the Ontario Securities Act provides:
(1) The Commission may, upon the application of an interested person or company, rule that
any trade, security, person or company is not subject to section 25 [dealer registration] or 53
[prospectus requirement] where it is satisfied that to do so would not be prejudicial to the public
interest, and may impose such terms and conditions as are considered necessary.
(2) Where doubt exists whether a distribution of any security has been concluded or is currently
in progress, the Commission may determine the question and rule accordingly.
(3) A decision of the Commission under this section is final and there is no appeal therefrom.
OSA, R.S.O. § 74 (1990).
PACIFIC RIM LAW & POLICY JOURNAL
major rethinking in the 1970s of the basis of the prospectus requirement in
Canada resulted in the so-called "closed system" for private placements.
32
Until that time, the subjective investment intent of the purchaser of
securities served to distinguish a public distribution of securities from a
private placement for which no prospectus was required.33 This is still the
case in the United States. 34 United States legal practitioners, in the absence
of regulatory guidance, developed technical and cumbersome procedures in
an attempt to satisfy the investment intent test for private placements. The
prospectus filing requirement imposed by section 5 of the 1933 Act (in the
ostensible interests of protection of the small retail investor) is such a
fundamental tenet of U.S. securities law, that the private placement market,
where a prospectus can be dispensed with, was long considered an excep-
tional regime and not necessarily one to be fostered or encouraged.
35
Canadian regulators did away with the subjective investment intent
test some fifteen years ago, introducing objective, bright line tests for
private placements. 36 For example, any single purchase of C$150,000
worth of securities is exempt from prospectus delivery requirements. 37 The
necessity for the cumbersome trappings and formalities characteristic of a
U.S. private placement simply dropped away, replaced by a post facto
notice filing.38
A final major difference between the two regulatory regimes is in
their administrative application. Although the SEC has made determined
efforts of late to present a friendly and facilitative face, 39 the perception
remains that you approach the SEC at your peril. Canadian issuers and
practitioners, in the British tradition, have enjoyed much greater and im-
mediate access to their regulators, resulting in more flexible application of
32 See GILLEN, supra note 8, at 177.
33 See DAVID W. DRINKWATER ET AL., PRIVATE PLACEMENTS IN CANADA 122-25 (1985).
34 A notable exception is Rule 144A under the 1933 Act. * Private Resales of Securities to
Institutions, 17 C.F.R. § 230.144A (1994); Reg. § 230.144 (Rule 144) Persons Deemed Not to be Engaged
in a Distribution and Therefore Not Underwriters, 2 Fed. Sec. L. Rep. (CCH) 1 5718. See infra parts
III.C.2, II.C.3.a.
35 The introduction of Rule 144A in 1990 went a long way in adapting the U.S. regulatory regime to
the realities of modern markets and the rise of the institutional investor.
36 See discussion infra "Exempt Private Placements" in app. A.
37 The actual monetary amount may vary from province to province.
38 OSA Regulations, R.R.O. Form 20.
39 For example, in encouraging issuers, especially foreign issuers, to contact them for guidance in
structuring transactions.
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the regulatory regime and greater reliance on both formal and informal ad
hoc solutions.
B. The Crisis in "Consensual" Regulation: The Breakdown of the
Canadian Way
The Canadian financial community is a small world and, until
recently, stresses and strains on the regulatory regime were accommodated
for the most part outside the formal legislative process. For a practitioner,
an informal meeting with the Chairman of the Ontario Securities
Commission could resolve a lot of problems. Equally, the Commission
relied on its stature and powers of moral suasion to ensure compliance with
the spirit and intent, as well as the letter,40 of the regulatory regime. 4 1
As the pace of change and complexity of financial markets increased,
greater and greater reliance was placed on these non-legislative mecha-
nisms. The legislature had neither the time, expertise, nor interest to deal
with the revolution occurring worldwide in financial markets. The CSA, in
an attempt to coordinate and adapt a rapidly aging regulatory regime to
40 See Canadian Tire Corp. (Re), 10 O.S.C.B. 857 (1987), where the Ontario Securities Commission,
referring to a statement made by it in Federal Commerce and Navigation Ltd., I O.S.C.B. 20(c) (1981),
said:
[The] statement is important as outlining the basic approach that the Commission is prepared to
take to a transaction in an appropriate case, particularly when a takeover bid is concerned. That
is not to say that the terms of the Act or policy statements or the by-laws of the self-regulatory
organizations, cannot be relied upon as they are written. It is to say, however, that transactions
that are clearly designed to avoid the animating principles behind such legislation and rules will
be scrutinized closely by the Commission and intervention will be ordered in appropriate cases.
(QL at 45).
41 According to J.C. Baillie & V.P. Alboini, The National Sea Decision--Exploring the Parameters
ofAdministrative Discretion, 2 C.B.L.J. 454,459-60 (1977-78) (footnotes omitted):
There can be no reasonable quarrel with the general statement that the O.S.C. may appropriately
deny trading privileges to persons who have engaged in improper activities. Historically,
trading privileges have been denied to persons who are considered to have abused the
registration exemptions, or have solicited funds from the public improperly or fraudulently, or
have sold securities to the public without a prospectus or with an inadequate prospectus. All of
these seem appropriate grounds for exercise of the s. 19(5) power, but the National Sea case
[(June 1976) O.S.C.B. 1491 significantly extends these traditional grounds. Denial of personal
trading privileges previously had not been used as a sanction to hold insiders accountable for
any improper trading in securities of their corporation nor to ensure timely disclosure
responsibility ....
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changing times, formalized the ad hoc responses of provincial regulators
into "National Policy Statements," which, although devoid of legislative
authority, were scrupulously adhered to. For many years, the system
worked, essentially because it was to everyone's benefit that it do so.
This "consensual" system of regulation, essentially a response to the
increasing change and complexity of financial markets, reached its limits.
Formal challenges to the coercive authority of policy statements, a rarity
only a few years ago, began to arise. In 1993, one such challenge prevailed
in the Ontario courts.42 The Ainsley decision (which correctly put its finger
on the lack of legislative authority behind policy statements) put into ques-
tion the entire elaborate structure erected by the CSA to govern national
markets and prompted creation of a task force in Ontario to look for answers
to the crisis thus provoked.43 In the year or so which it took the task force
to report, the Ontario Securities Commission hobbled along, acting by other
means such as blanket orders, with policy statements continuing to serve as
industry guidelines.
44
Not surprisingly, the solution proposed came from the United States:
SEC-like rule-making power for the Ontario Securities Commission.
45 The
solution is not, however, without controversy, applying as it does in the
context of a very different administrative law regime. But it is significant in
several respects. First, it represents the introduction of a fairly alien U.S.
solution to the Canadian regulatory environment, yet another indication of
the increasing convergence of the markets and their regulatory regimes.
42 In Ainsley Financial Corp. v. Ontario Securities Commission, 106 D.L.R. (4th) 507, 14 O.R. (3d)
280 (Gen. Div. 1993), the Court was asked to examine the jurisdiction of the Ontario Securities
Commission to issue a policy statement about trading in penny stocks. The policy statement set certain
disclosure requirements for traders who were not members of a self-regulatory organization. The Court
concluded that the policy statement was not a guideline, but rather was a mandatory or regulatory provision
that raised the specter of disciplinary proceedings for non-compliance. The Commission derived its
powers exclusively from the Ontario Securities Act, which did not provide the Commission with a
jurisdiction of general discretionary nature, nor was there an open-ended general "mandating" section in
the Act. Furthermore, the Securities Act did not give the Commission the general authority to regulate the
securities industry in the public interest. In addition, the particular policy statement fell within the
regulatory power of the Lieutenant-Governor in Council, such power which had not been delegated to the
Commission. The Court therefore held that the Commission did not have jurisdiction to issue the policy
statement.
43 On October 7, 1993, Ontario Finance Minister Floyd Laughren established a joint Ministry of
Finance and Ontario Securities Commission Task Force on Securities Regulation. See Task Force to
Examine Securities Regulation, 16 O.S.C.B. 5125 (Oct. 25, 1993).
44 See, e.g., the blanket ruling discussed infra at 23; prior to the Ainsley decision, this initiative
would have been implemented by policy statement.
45 Securities Amendment Act 1994. R.S.O. ch. 33.
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Additionally, the entire crisis itself is eloquent testimony to the limits
of "consensual" regulation. The Canadian securities industry is suffering
fragmentation and dislocation as a result of increasing outside pressures,
pressures from the United States, and the international markets. 46 These
pressures are breaking down the cozy communality of the industry by intro-
ducing new players and practices which are at odds with the old unwritten
(or, in the case of policy statements, unenforceable) rules. 47
C. The New Regulatory Tactics in Canada
1. Reciprocal Recognition
In one of the most comprehensive experiments in the application of
principles of reciprocal recognition,48 Canada and the United States imple-
mented the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System ("MJDS") in 1991.49 The
system is one of mutual recognition, where both countries' regulatory
regimes, each the virtual mirror image of the other, recognize and defer to
one another. Certain U.S. issuers are permitted, under the Canadian rules,
to issue securities in Canada utilizing a U.S. prospectus which is in con-
46 The Canadian investment dealer community, for example, was opposed to implementation of the
MJDS discussed infra pt. III.C. Their concerns are reflected in the following statement which appeared in
the implementing release:
Given the importance to the CSA (Canadian Securities Administrators) of having a strong dealer
community knowledgeable of and committed to the Canadian capital markets, the CSA believes
the MJDS should include a "safety valve" that is available if the MJDS does prove to harm the
Canadian dealer community substantially. The CSA will monitor the effect of the MJDS and
obtain input from Canadian dealers and otherwise monitor the dealer community. In addition,
the securities regulators in Canada will, if more than two years following the implementation of
the MJDS to review the MJDS, including its impact on the bank-owned dealers. If the hearings
demonstrate that the MJDS has had and will continue to have a material adverse effect on the
Canadian dealer community, the CSA and the Commission will commence rulemaking
proceedings to seek comment on such changes to the MJDS as are needed to alleviate such
adverse effect on the dealers and to ensure that the MJDS achieves its policy goals.
SEC Release No. 33-6902, Multijurisdictional Disclosure and Modifications to the Current Registration
and Reporting System for Canadian Issuers, 56 Fed. Reg. 30,036, at 30049-50 (1991).
47 Consensual regulation continues to be useful, for example in the Euromarket, where through the
development of widely accepted industry guidelines, the imposition of formal legislative norms has been
averted.
48 The European Union, of course, has made widespread use of reciprocal recognition techniques.
49 See supra note 46; infra pt. I11.C.; National Policy Statement No. 45, 14 O.S.C.B. 2889 (June 28,
1991).
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formity with U.S. requirements.5 0 Similarly, certain Canadian issuers are
permitted, under U.S. rules, to issue securities in the United States using a
Canadian prospectus which is in accordance with Canadian timing and
filing requirements.
5 1
Inspired by the Euromarket, the MJDS began as a remarkably simple
idea: the standardization of the offering documentation for issuances of
debt securities in the interests of speeding up the offering process. The SEC
recognized that, for debt securities, an investment decision was much more
influenced by an investment grade rating than by prospectus disclosure.
Recognition of a foreign prospectus for use in the United States for invest-
ment grade debt could thus eliminate the cost and delays associated with
regulatory duplication without unduly sacrificing investor protection
concerns.
As the idea of reciprocal recognition sprouted, a mighty regulatory
oak took shape. Debt and equity offerings, rights and exchange offerings,
business combinations, continuous disclosure for both MJDS and other
issuers, proxy rules, even recognition of Canada as a sovereign nation, all
became part of the system. 52 Needless to say, the increased complexity of
the system brought on by these additions has had a significant impact on its
utilization by Canadian issuers. 53
The new system has provided Canadian issuers with a wide range of
options and choice in terms of entering the U.S. capital markets and broad
exemptive relief for all Canadian issuers, irrespective of MJDS eligibility,
from duplicative regulation in other areas such as proxy solicitation and
continuous disclosure. Also, the system has delivered more or less what
was expected in terms of facilitating U.S. offerings of investment grade debt
by Canadian issuers.
Investment grade debt offerings under the MJDS outnumber equity
offerings two to one and are relatively true to the principles of reciprocal
recognition underlying the system. 54 It remains the case, however, that
50 National Policy Statement No. 45, supra note 49.
51 Id.
52 Id.
53 The MJDS has proved to be a one-way street, a means of enticing more Canadian issuers into the
U.S. public markets. In the first two years of operation of the system, no U.S. issuer made use of it
although dozens of Canadian issuers did.
54 According to statistics provided to the author by SEC Staff, the debt issues outnumber equity
issues two to one under the MJDS with US$3.5 billion in debt securities being registered with the SEC in
1993 compared to US$0.6 billion in equity.
VOL. 4 No. 3
JULY 1995 REGULATION OF CANADIAN CAPITAL MARKETS
utilization of the regime is more difficult and complex than originally
envisaged, even for investment grade debt offerings. Of the many factors
contributing to this, one is the "capture" of the regime by U.S. lawyers and
investment dealers (not known to miss an opportunity to create a demand
for their services). The original principle of reciprocal recognition, i.e., the
ability to use a Canadian prospectus to do a public offering in the United
States, has been distorted by one of the asymmetrical aspects of the regime,
the retention of U.S. civil liability by the SEC for the prospectus document.
The hook of U.S. civil liability has been used to justify a predictable
convergence of Canadian and U.S. prospectus disclosure in MJDS offer-
ings. United States investment dealers promote such convergence for
marketing reasons; in order to sell the securities in the United States, the
prospectus should have a U.S. "look." United States lawyers insist on U.S.-
style due diligence and disclosure on the basis of the exposure to U.S.
liability.
Although there is no evidence to date that the concerns with U.S. civil
liability have materialized, this may be a result of Canadian MJDS prospec-
tuses having become virtually indistinguishable from U.S. domestic
registration statements. ' It is certainly arguable that this was not at all
intended by the regulators in implementing the MJDS and was not an
inevitable consequence.
The MJDS is significant in several respects. From the point of view
of the SEC, the interest in the MJDS was as a model of future (and to date
unconsummated) cooperation with bigger fish than Canada. It shows that
the Canadian regulatory focus has been fixed squarely on the United States,
largely as a result of the acceleration of integration of North American
capital markets. As underutilized as it may be, the MJDS does create the
infrastructure for an integrated North American capital market. Closely
linked as it is to the U.S. domestic regulatory regime, the MJDS is
extremely sensitive to changes in it.
Canadian regulators, now tied to the U.S. regime through the MJDS,
will be compelled to take into account, in a very timely fashion, develop-
ments in the United States. This will give rise to hard regulatory choices
and questions as to the extent Canadian regulators set their own agenda in
the Canadian market. It heralds the introduction of U.S.-style regulation in
Canada and all the complexity that it entails.
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2. Harmonization of North American Regulatory Regimes
Canadian securities regulation has been inspired by and profoundly
marked by the U.S. regulatory regime. Harmonization of the Canadian
regime to the U.S. regime would seem to be a given, as natural as a dog
wagging its tail. Until fairly recently, however, this has not been a forgone
conclusion, in Ontario at least. Up until negotiations for the MJDS began in
1987, U.S. regulatory developments were regarded with some circumspec-
tion by Canadian regulators. For example, in 1986 Ontario regulators
considered and rejected introducing a shelf prospectus system. 55 Only a
few years later, prompted by imminent implementation of the MJDS, a shelf
prospectus system was adopted by National Policy Statement 44;56 large
parts of the Canadian regime follow the U.S. model found in SEC Rule
41557 (Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities) word for
word. Even now, there is still some resistance and bewilderment on the part
of the Canadian industry and practitioners with respect to the speed and
massive degree of recent harmonization.
The watershed has been the introduction of the MJDS. Over the
course of its negotiation, Canadian securities regimes became increasingly
aligned with that of the United States. Certain changes to the Canadian
regimes had been under consideration for some time and merely reflected
the natural process of evolution and adaptation to changing market condi-
tions. The introduction of other U.S.-style disclosure, however, can be
directly traced to the MJDS negotiations. In some instances, Canadian
regulators, as they became more familiar with the U.S. regime in the course
of the negotiations, simply couldn't resist picking up on a good regulatory
idea when they saw one. In other instances, harmonization of the Canadian
regime to some aspect of the U.S. one was used explicitly by the SEC as a
bargaining chip in the MJDS negotiations. Yet other harmonizing meas-
ures, such as a shelf registration system, were introduced in Canada to
55 Qudbec did not have the same hesitations and opened the door to shelf registrations in 1983. See
§§ 21-24 of the Quebec Securities Act, R.S.Q. ch. V-I (as amended) and §§ 74-76 of the R6glement sur les
valeurs mobilires, O.C. 660-83 (as amended). None were effected, given that eligible issuers were not
interested in setting up a shelf only in Quebec.
56 National Policy Statement No. 44: Rules for Shelf Prospectus Offerings and for Pricing Offerings
After the Final Prospectus is Receipted, 14 O.S.C.B. 1844 (May 3, 1991).
57 Delayed or Continuous Offering and Sale of Securities, 17 C.F.R. § 230.415 (1994).
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ensure that the MJDS operated in a fairly equivalent manner for both U.S.
and Canadian issuers.58
Ironically, to date the most palpable influence of the MJDS has been
felt by Canadian issuers in their own backyard as a result of the harmoniz-
ing impact of the MJDS on the Canadian domestic securities regime. The
pressures of convergence have not diminished since the introduction of the
MJDS. Recent changes to U.S. short form prospectus eligibility require-
ments respecting the length of reporting history and market capitalization
(reflected in crucial MJDS eligibility requirements) resulted promptly in
corresponding changes to both the domestic Canadian Prompt Offering
Prospectus system and the parallel MJDS regimes. 59
In an interesting twist, the MJDS eliminated certain continuous
disclosure filing requirements for Canadian issuers in the United States in
an effort to lessen the regulatory burden imposed by duplication. This in
turn led to a public outcry for more stringent and broadly-based U.S.-style
domestic rules in Ontario. The MJDS permitted many Canadian issuers,
otherwise reporting in the United States under domestic U.S. continuous
disclosure rules, to switch to use of their Canadian continuous disclosure for
reporting purposes. Canadians are a discreet bunch and individualized
executive compensation disclosure, as in many European countries, was not
required in Canada. For example, Canadian investors searching the public
file in Canada would not be able to discover the remuneration of the CEO of
Alcan.
The switch to Canadian continuous disclosure for U.S. filing
requirements, however, deprived the Canadian financial press of a reliable
source of individualized executive compensation disclosure. Prior to the
switch, they had been resorting to the U.S. public file for this information.
A hue and cry went up (in the financial press, of course) and, not without
controversy, U.S.-style executive compensation rules were introduced
domestically in Ontario.60 As the rules apply generally to all reporting
38 Because the MJDS is a reciprocal recognition system, unless a shelf registration system was
available to Canadian issuers in Canada, they could not have made use of it to issue in the United States
under the MJDS; United States issuers, on the other hand, would have had the ability to use the U.S. shelf
system under the MJDS to issue in Canada, something Canadian issuers would not have been able to do
domestically.
59 See Amendments to the Multijurisdictional Disclosure System for Canadian Issuers, 58 Fed. Reg.
62,028 (1993).
60 The Commission granted a Blanket Order dated December I, 1993, entitled In the Matter of Part
XIX of the Securities Act and In the Matter of Ontario Regulation 638/93 and the Disclosure of Executive
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issuers in Ontario (and not only those reporting in the United States), their
impact was considerable. For the first time, the major Canadian financial
institutions, which had never been subject to U.S. continuous disclosure,
found themselves complying with less discreet U.S.-style executive
compensation disclosure rules in Canada. Although issuer resistance to the
imposition of U.S.-style disclosure in Canada has been very real, as the
number of cross-border transactions increases and Canadian issuers flock to
the U.S. markets, it is likely the resistance will fade away.
This leaves a question begging to be asked. To what extent has the
Canadian securities regime had a harmonizing influence on the U.S. regula-
tory regime?
The influences, if indeed there are any, are very subtle. The SEC in
recent years has not consciously turned to Canadian securities regulation for
inspiration. Nevertheless, the MJDS negotiations between Canadian and
U.S. regulators did proceed over a period of five years, a period during
which each regulator set out to learn a great deal about the other's
regulatory regime. There may be trace elements of Canadian securities
regulation which, having been negotiated into the MJDS, are now rising to
the surface in the domestic U.S. regime.6 1
For example, it is difficult, at least from a Canadian perspective, to
look at SEC Rule 144A without remarking on the similarities to the much
more comprehensive Canadian closed system for private placements.
Whether or not there was, in fact, any cross-fertilization is not readily
apparent. The similarities are more likely the result of market-induced con-
vergence rather than an explicit attempt at harmonization of regimes.
As integration of the North American capital markets proceeds at a
fast clip, the pressures tending towards harmonization of the Canadian
Compensation and of Indebtedness of Directors, Exetutive Officers and Senior Officers made under §
88(2) of the Ontario Securities Act and the Director of Corporate Finance granted a Blanket Permission
dated December 1, 1993 made under § 81 of the Regulation to the Securities Act. Blanket
Permission-Section 81 of Reg, 16 O.S.C.B. 5914 (Dec. 3, 1993). The Blanket Order and Blanket
Permission contained certain transitional provisions with respect to the executive compensation and
indebtedness disclosure requirements set out in Ontario Regulation 638/93. The Blanket Permission and
Blanket Order were amended in Ontario Regulation 638/93 and the Disclosure of Executive Compensation
and of Indebtedness of Directors, Executive Officers and Senior Officers--s. 144, 17 O.S.C.B. 1176 (Mar.
11, 1994), to correct the termination dates for the transitional accommodation set forth therein.
61 The U.S. short form prospectus requirements (found in Forms S-2 and S-3) were recently changed
to require a public float of US$75 million or more. This US$75 million figure may very well come from
the MJDS eligibility criteria; it was originally inspired, in the MJDS, by a size threshold in the Canadian
Prompt Offering Prospectus system.
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securities regimes to that in the United States, especially in the area of dis-
closure, will only increase. An assessment of the long-term implications of
this process may be more difficult to formulate. Certainly, there are differ-
ences of opinion between issuers and the industry on the one hand (which
tend to resist U.S.-style disclosure, arguing that it is unnecessarily burden-
some), and the financial press and investor groups on the other (which
celebrated mightily when Matthew Barrett, the well-regarded Chairman of
the Bank of Montreal, was first required to disclose his compensation in
1994).62
On balance, the importation of more extensive disclosure obligations
should provide a tonic to the relatively closed and close world of corporate
Canada. This is not to say that U.S.-style disclosure is a panacea for all that
might ail Canadian capital markets. More is not necessarily better and there
is certainly controversy as to whether U.S.-style disclosure as it has evolved
does in fact provide the proper measure of investor protection. There are
regulatory alternatives to disclosure as the basic tool of investor protection,
most notably, the trend in other jurisdictions towards regulation of financial
intermediaries in their dealings with public investors.
Finally, there are dangers associated with over-enthusiastic harmoni-
zation. Homogenization can stifle innovation and the survival of solutions
better adapted to local conditions. Is the imported shelf prospectus system a
better solution in the Canadian context than the indigenous bought deal?63
Would the Canadian closed system for private placements, developed
almost 15 years ago and so different from the U.S. regime, have seen the
light of day in the current regulatory environment?
62 It even became the subject of an interview with a popular talk show host.
63 See Brokers Take a Risk With "Bought Deal" Issues, GLOBE & MAIL (Toronto), Apr. 29, 1995, at
B4.
Almost every equity issue in [Canada], other than an initial offering, is done through a
'bought deal.' A group of investment dealers puts up its own money to buy an entire issue of
shares at a present price and then resells them to its biggest clients.
This is unlike a regular underwriting, where the price is set only after the brokers have
assessed how many shares their clients are willing to buy and how much they are willing to pay
.... Bought deals are popular with companies because they provide a quick and guaranteed
way of raising funds.
Brokers like bought deals because they can charge higher fees ...as compensation for
taking all the risk. If they can't sell the units at the preset price, they take a loss.
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3. Free-riding as a Regulatory Technique
Canadian regulators have been in the vanguard with respect to apply-
ing principles of harmonization and mutual recognition to their regulatory
regimes. Harmonization efforts have met with resistance, as discussed
above, but in general have been more productive than in other parts of the
world. This is largely a result of the advanced state of economic integration
in North American capital markets and the existing structural similarities of
the U.S. and Canadian regimes. Formal efforts at harmonization elsewhere
have not been as successful; it is hard slogging and, unless implemented
unilaterally as in Canada, not particularly well adapted to an area as
complex and volatile as capital markets..
The MJDS, on the other hand, is a model of regulatory cooperation
based on principles of reciprocal recognition which have shown tangible
results elsewhere, as well. It too, however, can be a slow and painful
process. The MJDS negotiations stretched over five years and the system
itself has required constant monitoring and attention on both sides of the
border ever since.
The Ontario Securities Commission has now launched itself on a new
regulatory tack, free-riding. What is free-riding? Hitching your cart to
someone else's horse, in this case, Uncle Sam's.
The impetus to draft National Policy No. 53 ("draft NP 53"), the
"Foreign Issuer Prospectus and Continuous Disclosure System" 64 and the
Ontario Securities Commission Blanket Ruling re Certain International
Offerings by Private Placement ("the private placement ruling") 65 has been
the concern among Canadian regulators that the world may be passing the
small Canadian markets by. Both initiatives are based on the principle that
compliance with foreign regulatory requirements will constitute compliance
with domestic Ontario regulations. Unlike the MJDS, both measures were
undertaken unilaterally; there is no reciprocity required with other recog-
nized regulatory regimes.
64 Draft National Policy Statement No. 53-Foreign Issuer Prospectus and Continuous Disclosure
System, 16 O.S.C.B. 4125 (Aug. 20, 1993).
65 Blanket Ruling-Regulation 1015 R.R.O. 1990, as Amended and Certain International Offerings
by Private Placement in Ontario, 16 O.S.C.B. 5931 (Dec. 3, 1993).
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a. Draft National Policy No. 53
Draft NP 53 was first put out for comment in August 1993, obviously
with an eye to the then imminent French and Latin American privatiza-
tions.66 It has not as of yet been implemented. In its structure and concept
it was a direct outgrowth of the MJDS, building on foreign issuer defini-
tions, market capitalization and public float requirements, the use of
legending to alert investors to the foreign nature of the issuer and the
offering, as well as the retention of domestic civil liability.67 If it has not
yet been implemented, it may well be that it went too far, or at least further
than the market justified.
68
Virtually all large foreign issuers meeting the eligibility criteria 69 and
engaging in a global equity offering would be able to come into the
Canadian public market using foreign offering documentation. As origi-
nally proposed, a broad range of offering documentation would have been
acceptable: home country documentation by G-7 issuers or G-7 documen-
tation7 0 used by any other foreign issuer would have fulfilled Canadian
prospectus requirements.7 ' Even a Rule 144A offering memorandum used
in a U.S. private placement could have served as a prospectus in a Canadian
public offering.72
66 See supra note 64.
67 See supra note 64.
68 See criticisms of draft NP 53 by this author in Cally Jordan, The Thrills and Spills of Free-Riding:
International Issues Before the Ontario Securities Commission, 23 C.B.L.J. 379 (1994). The major
criticism of this author, the breadth of NP 53's scope, apparently has been addressed in a subsequent
revision not yet publicly available. "That draft [NP53] has been revised to extend the Multi-Jurisdictional
Disclosure System-the system that allows U.S. issuers to access the Canadian markets using U.S.
documentation and Canadian issuers to access the U.S. market using Canadian documentation--4o large
foreign issuers." See Barry Critchley, OSC Smooths Path for Foreign Issuers, FIN. POST (Toronto), Dec.
10,1994, at44.
69 To be eligible, the entity must be a foreign issuer in Canada, not incorporated or organized in
Canada, and subject to certain other criteria based on greater than 50% share ownership and management
control outside Canada. The issuer must have C$3 billion market capitalization (in the case of an initial
public offering, based on the expected offering price) with a public float of C$I billion, both figures being
calculated after giving effect to the offering. In addition, the issuer must reasonably believe that no more
than 10% of its equity is held in Canada. See infra app. B.
70 The term G-7 refers to the group of seven nations representing the largest economies in the world.
The G-7 nations are: Canada, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
71 Subject to meeting the Canadian standard of "full, true and plain disclosure" of all material facts.
72 See supra note 64.
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To judge by recent comments in the financial press, 73 the regulatory
approach now being considered would be to narrow the acceptable offering
documentation to that used in a U.S. public offering, i.e., unilaterally to
extend use of the MJDS in Canada to foreign issuers entering the U.S.
market.
This makes sense. Any major global equity offering is going to go
through the United States, although, it is true, that not all such issues will be
made by public offering there. Rule 144A does provide an attractive alter-
native to the public markets for foreign equity. Still, as extensive as Rule
144A disclosure documents may be in the United States, they are not
subject to regulatory scrutiny there74 and strong policy reasons would
militate against their use in Canada in a public offering. 75
As an example of the flexibility of the Canadian regulatory approach,
and in recognition of the importance of the role played by Rule 144A in
international equity markets, ad hoc exemptive relief from Canadian
prospectus requirements would be available. In cases where the foreign
issuer is not making a public offering in the United States, the regulators
will conduct a case-by-case review.76 In addition, pending final implemen-
tation of NP 53, case-by-case waivers and exemptions will be considered in
two key areas: eliminating the need for reconciliation to Canadian gener-
ally accepted accounting principles and permitting international dealers to
sell such securities in a Canadian public offering.77
By hitching their cart to the U.S. regulatory horse, Canadian regula-
tors are trying to ensure that Canadian capital markets get to go along for
the ride by reducing regulatory barriers and the compliance costs associated
with duplicative regulation. Canadian regulatory requirements are
suppressed in reliance on compliance with those of the United States. The
proponents of regulatory free-riding have usually recommended it as a
cheap and easy fix to fill the regulatory void in emerging markets. 78
73 Barry Critchley, supra note 68.
74 However, they are subject to the sobering effects of statutory liability for misrepresentations under
§ 12(2) ofthe 1933.Act.
75 See Cally Jordan, The Thrills and Spills of Free-Riding, supra note 67, for a discussion of the
concerns raised by the proposal originally contained in NP 53. It appears that these concerns have been
addressed in the subsequent revisions to the policy.
76 See supra note 64.
77 See In the Matter of Allied-Domecq PLC, 18 O.S.C.B. 353 (Jan. 27, 1995), where such relief was
granted.
78 See D. Lessard, The Global Financial Revolution, Remarks at IOSCO XVIII Annual Conference,
Mexico City, Mexico (Oct. 26, 1993).
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Does the United States have anything to say about this? From its
point of view, the more free-riders there are, the greater the assurance of
U.S. dominance of global markets. Rather like the story of Beta and VHS
or Apple and IBM, there may have been a better product out there, but the
propagation of systems technology created the sheer mass of market share
that resulted in one product prevailing over another. Thus the U.S. interest
in promoting the adoption of U.S.-style regulatory regimes and free-riding
in the emerging markets. The United States wants to ensure that its product
set the industry standard.
b. The private placement ruling
The private placement ruling, unlike draft NP 53, is restricted to
private placements in Ontario, and also institutionalizes relief which was
granted on an ad hoc basis in the past.79 Also, unlike draft NP 53, the
private placement ruling is highly focused and quite narrow in the relief
which it grants.
The private placement ruling permits the use of U.S. or U.K. offering
documentation in a limited number of private placements.80  The
significance of this ruling goes far beyond mere issues of disclosure. Due to
the curious nature of the remedy for misrepresentation in private placements
in Ontario (it is a contractual right which must be disclosed), acceptance of
foreign offering documentation results in the Ontario investor having no
domestic remedy. In fact, the Ontario investor may have no foreign remedy
either.8'
79 Supra note 65.
8o Offerings eligible to benefit from the relief granted by the private placement ruling are the
following:
(1) "International offerings," i.e., made in one or more jurisdictions outside Canada;
(2) Ontario private placements exempt under § 72(1 Xc) or (d) of the Securities Act, i.e.,
exempt investors as recognized by the Commission, or investors purchasing $150,000
in the aggregate; and
(3) concurrent offerings in the United States (by prospectus or private placement
memorandum) or in the United Kingdom.
Such offerings are allowed to rely on a U.S. private placement memorandum or a U.K. prospectus
(constituting or including "listing particulars"), which may be supplemented by Canada-specific
information.
S For a discussion of the difficulties raised by the private placement ruling in this regard, see Jordan,
The Thrills and Spills of Free-Riding, supra note 67. In response to the recent decision of the United States
Supreme Court in Gustafson v. Alloyd Co., Inc., 131 L. Ed. 2d. 1 (1995) which raised some issues relating
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In this respect the Ontario Securities Commission may have over-
stepped the bounds of acceptable free-riding. However, the real problem
resides in the use of contractual rights of rescission and damages to impose
liability for misrepresentation in the context of a private placement in
Ontario. This is a false "regulatory hurdle." It was intended as a stop gap
measure pending the introduction of statutory liability along U.S. lines. As
often happens, a makeshift solution proved adequate enough to preclude
adoption of a preferable one. The legislation proposing statutory liability
was never implemented.
82
Statutory liability is industry standard; Ontario's contractual rights of
rescission are an anomaly exposed by the glare of the international market.
A better response would be to correct the anomaly, not deprive Ontario
investors of a remedy on the basis that it is necessary to ensure the interna-
tional competitiveness of Ontario capital markets.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Canadian securities regulatory regime has in recent years been
shaken by profound changes in capital markets, both in North America and
to the availability to Canadian purchasers of the remedy under § 12(2) of the U.S. Securities Act of 1933,
the Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission issued a notice, 18 O.S.C.B. 1350 (1995), stating that it has
undertaken a review of the impact of the Gustafson decision on the blanket ruling, which is now a rule, and
that pending completion of such review, issuers and their advisers are recommended to exercise caution
before relying on the blanket ruling. In the event that issuers or other parties intend to rely upon the rule,
in the view of the Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission, it may be appropriate to incorporate into the
offering documents additional disclosure concerning the possible unavailability of certain U.S. remedies
that were previously thought to be available.
82 Like NP 53, the Ontario Securities Commission's private placement blanket ruling was designed
to overcome certain of the Canadian regulatory hurdles identified by foreign issuers as hindering the
inclusion of Canadian markets in securities issues around the world and barriers to attracting transactions
domestically. The private placement ruling grants relief by accepting foreign offering documentation
where a private placement is made in the course of a concurrent offering in the United Kingdom or the
United States.
Canadian commentators noted that though Ontario common law standards would continue to apply,
the ruling served to eliminate contractual rights of rescission for foreign offerings, a remedy that had been
adopted in 1979. See § 20(2)(a) of Ontario Reg. 478/79. The Ontario Securities Commission had pushed
for the inclusion of this right when it became aware that many trades were being made under prospectus
exemptions without adequate disclosure of material information to purchasers. The Commission
consequently required investors receiving an offering memorandum to be granted a contractual right of
action for rescission or damages exercisable within 90 days of initial or full payment for the securities.
This contractual right of action was to be temporary only, and was intended to be replaced by an
imminent amendment to the Ontario Securities Act, introducing statutory liability much along the lines of
§ 12(2) of the 1993 Act in the United States.
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around the world. The old certainties and understandings no longer hold
true as world markets impinge upon the Canadian markets. In the face of a
highly competitive environment among capital markets, Canadian regula-
tors are struggling to keep the Canadian markets from following the road to
insignificance in the global scheme of things.
At the domestic level, the impact of changing times has been felt in
renewed calls for a national securities regulator in Canada. "Almost every-
one involved in the process concedes that the current regime is no longer
effective. Canada is the only major industrialized country that does not
have a national securities regulator, yet the industry has grown far beyond
its provincial borders." 83  Unfortunately, the federal government has
abdicated its legislative jurisdiction in this area and the process of imple-
mentation has become highly politicized, resulting, predictably, in an
impasse.
The most significant factor currently affecting the regulation of
Canadian capital markets is without a doubt the increasing pace of North
American economic integration. Not only is the Canadian securities regul-
atory regime being brought more and more into line with the substantive
provisions of U.S. regulation (or, in the case of draft NP 53 and the private
placement ruling, reliance on compliance with U.S. rules), the entire
regulatory culture is being transformed. There is still a rocky road ahead for
Canadian securities regulators, and, no doubt about it, the United States is in
the driver's seat.
83 See Karen Howlett, National Securities Watchdog Urged, GLOBE AND MAIL (Toronto), Feb. 16,
1995, at B3.
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The securities laws of Canada consist of a mosaic of federal and
provincial laws, with the provincial laws playing the predominant role. The
primary reference sources to the Canadian regulatory scheme for securities
matters are:
(1) the securities law statutes of the ten provinces and two territories;
(2) the regulations passed under such statutes;
(3) the provincial policy statements and practice notes; and
(4) the National Policy Statements.
It should be recognized by non-residents, that when dealing with the
markets of Canada, the basic pragmatic rule is to meet the strictest require-
ment imposed by any Canadian jurisdiction which thereby automatically
meets less strict requirements imposed by other Canadian jurisdictions. As
the requirements under the Ontario Securities Act84 (the "OSA") are, gen-
erally speaking, the strictest imposed by any Canadian jurisdiction, textual
references are made only to the corresponding provisions of the OSA.
84OSA, RS.O. ch. S.5 (1990), as amended.
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Given the rate at which capital markets are evolving, the "policy
statement" has become one of the most important regulatory mechanisms in
Canada. Legislation simply cannot keep up with the market. Although
certain recent judicial decisions have cast doubt on the authority of the
provincial securities regulators to enforce compliance with their numerous
policy instruments,85 participants in Canadian capital markets generally
treat such policy statements as if they had the force of law. In response to
these decisions and in recognition of the fact that policy statements are the
only vehicle by which dynamic domestic and international capital markets
may be effectively regulated, the government of Ontario recently passed the
Securities Amendment Act, 199486 to give the Ontario Securities
Commission ("OSC") the jurisdiction to create rules that have the force of
law and the power to enforce compliance with them. The Securities
Amendment Act, 1994 also elevated many of the OSC's policy statements to
the status of "rules." While the OSC remains able to issue policy statements
that do not have the force of law, such power has been specifically
limited-policies may only set forth guidelines for the exercise of discre-
tion, interpretive issues, and other practices-they may not be "prohibitive
or mandatory" in nature.
In the absence of a national securities commission, the National
Policy Statements serve an extremely important coordinating function in the
regulation of Canadian capital markets. The National Policy Statements are
the product of meetings of an ad hoc group of provincial securities adminis-
trators, the Canadian Securities Administrators, and provide those seeking
to raise capital in Canada with an efficient and coordinated approach to
interacting with and between the various provincial securities administra-
tors. National Policy No. 1, for example, is a policy designed to facilitate
the clearance of a prospectus filed in more than one province.
II. THE PROSPECTUS SYSTEM
For those familiar with the system in the United States, the Canadian
prospectus qualification requirements are similar to the registration of
85 Ainsley Financial Corp. v. Ontario Securities Commission, 16 O.S.C.B. 4077 (1993), 106 D.L.R.
(4th) 507 (Gen. Div. 1993); Pezim v. British Columbia Securities Commission, 66 B.C.L.R. (2d) 257 (C.A.
1992), rev'd, 4 C.C.L.S. 1117 (S.C.C. 1994).
86 Securities Amendment Act, R.S.O. ch. 33 (1994).
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securities requirements imposed by the Securities and Exchange
Commission pursuant to its legislative mandate.
Public offerings of securities in Canada are effected by the filing of a
preliminary prospectus and a prospectus the forms of which are provided for
in the Regulations to the various Securities Acts. Basically, the prospectus
form is a disclosure document in narrative form containing current financial
information as well as all "material facts" 87 related to the public company.
The directors and officers of the issuing corporation, any "promoter" of the
securities offered by a prospectus, and the "underwriter" of the issue are
each required to certify the prospectus in substantially the following
language: "The foregoing constitutes full, true and plain disclosure of all
material facts relating to the securities offered by this prospectus as required
by ... the Securities Act and the regulations thereunder.
'88 The wording of
the underwriter's certificate is slightly less onerous and is qualified by "the
best of [the underwriter's] knowledge, information and belief," thus giving
rise to a due diligence defense.
89
Civil liability for "misrepresentations" 90 in a prospectus attaches to
each person who certifies a prospectus.9 1  In addition, any person or
company that makes a statement in any preliminary prospectus or prospec-
tus that, at the time and in the light of the circumstances under which it is
made, is a "misrepresentation," is guilty of an offense and, on conviction, is
liable to fine or imprisonment or both.92 Certain defenses to civil liability,
most notably the defense of reasonable investigation or "due diligence," are
available to persons other than the issuer.
93
Subject to certain exceptions and possible exemptions, every prospec-
tus must contain a balance sheet as of a date not more than 120 days prior to
the date of the issuance of a receipt for the preliminary prospectus, and as of
the corresponding date of the previous financial year as well as an income
statement, a statement of surplus and statement of changes in financial
87 OSA, R.S.O. § I(1) (1990) defines a "material fact" as a fact that significantly affects, or would
reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on, the market price or value of securities issued or
proposed to be issued.
99 OSA, R.S.O. § 58 (1990).
89 Id. § 59.
90 OSA, R.S.O. § 1(1) (1990) defines a "misrepresentation" as an untrue statement of material fact,
or an omission to state a material fact that is required to be stated or that is necessary to make a statement
not misleading in the light of the circumstances in which it was made.
91 OSA, R.S.O. § 130 (1990).
92 Id
93 Id.
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position for each of the last five financial years, and any part of a subse-
quent financial year to the date at which the balance sheet is made up.94
The securities law statutes of the provinces and territories provide,
generally speaking, that all financial matters must be presented on the basis
of Canadian generally accepted accounting principles. Aside from limited,
specialized situations, such as for banks incorporated under the Bank Act
(Canada),95 Canadian GAAP refers to the rules and procedures of the
Canadian Institute of Chartered Accoutntants in the manner specified in their
Handbook. Unlike under United States securities law, where an issuer is
incorporated or organized in a non-Canadian jurisdiction, financial state-
ments may be presented in accordance with the "generally accepted
accounting principles" of the incorporating jurisdiction, provided that a
statement to this effect is included in the notes to the financial statements.
National Policy No. 3 provides that only persons independent of the
company and its affiliates and of the directors and officers of the company
and its affiliates qualify to be auditors. While independence is ultimately a
question of fact, National Policy No. 3 deems certain persons that have
economic or other direct or indirect interests in an issuer not to be
independent. An exemption order may be granted, however, upon applica-
tion to a court, if this would not unfairly prejudice shareholders.
A company that intends to effect a public offering of securities within
a particular province or territory of Canada must first file a preliminary
prospectus with the securities commission of that particular jurisdiction. 96
The company will then be issued a "preliminary receipt" for its preliminary
prospectus from the securities commission with which it was filed.97
During the ten days following the issuance of the preliminary receipt while
the issuer awaits written comments on its preliminary prospectus from the
securities commission with which it was filed, an issuer's marketing efforts
are significantly restricted. 98  While an issuer may advertise the security
94 OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 53 (1990).
95 Bank Act, S.C. ch. 46(1991).
96 OSA, R.S.O. § 53(l) (1990).
9 Id.§ 55.
98 Id. § 65. The OSC takes the position that except for the limited distribution of materials permitted
under § 65(2), only the preliminary prospectus may be distributed during the "waiting period." In the view
of the OSC, marketing brochures and other forms of marketing information and material distributed to
prospective investors during the "waiting period" are being distributed in contravention of § 53(1) of the
OSA. See Advertising and Use of Marketing Material During the Waiting Period, 10 O.S.C.B. 2831 (May
15, 1987). The OSC also takes the position that no interviews should be given to the financial media by
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proposed to be issued, it must ensure that all such communications identify
from whom a preliminary prospectus may be obtained and that the prelimi-
nary prospectus is forwarded to each prospective purchaser from whom the
issuer solicits expressions of interest. 99
The company will usually receive written comments on its prelimi-
nary prospectus from the securities commission within 10 days following
the issuance of the preliminary receipt. Once the securities commission is
satisfied that all of its comments have been resolved and the issuer files its
final prospectus with that securities commission, a "final receipt" will be
issued and the issuer may begin sales of its qualified securities in that
particular province.100 A final receipt must be issued for a prospectus
unless it appears that it is not in the public interest to do so.IOI Generally
speaking, a prospectus for which a final receipt has been issued has a life
span of one year but may be renewed.102
An issuer contemplating qualifying an offering in more than one
province must follow the procedures set out in National Policy No. 1. The
policy provides that a preliminary prospectus, together with the supporting
material listed in the policy, shall be filed, as nearly as may be practicable,
contemporaneously with the securities administrator in each province in
which it is proposed to qualify the offering. The issuer selects one of the
provinces as the principal jurisdiction and advises each of the other juris-
dictions of the name of the principal jurisdiction. The principal jurisdiction
will review the material and will use its best efforts to issue the first written
comments within ten working days from the date the receipt for the prelimi-
nary prospectus was received. The first comment letter will be transmitted
by the principal jurisdiction immediately to each of the other filing jurisdic-
tions and to the issuer or the issuer's solicitor. The other jurisdictions will
use their best efforts to advise the principal jurisdiction of any additional
comments within five working days of receipt of the first comment letter.
The issuer or the issuer's solicitors will provide written responses to the
comment letters, and when the principal jurisdiction is satisfied that all
comments have been resolved and a final prospectus, together with support-
directors or senior officers of the issuer immediately prior to or during the "waiting period." See Media
Articles Appearing During the Waiting Period, I I O.S.C.B. 1098 (Mar. 4, 1988).
99 SA, R.S.O. § 65 (1990).
100 Id. § 61.
1l Id.
102 Id. § 62.
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ing documents, has been filed, the principal jurisdiction will issue a final
receipt. The other jurisdictions will issue final receipts after receipt by them
of acceptable final material and after receipt of advice as to the issuance of
the final receipt by the principal jurisdiction.
In an attempt to avoid duplicative filings and delays, a system of
"expedited review" has recently been introduced. Issuers that have been
"reporting issuers" 103 in one or more of the provinces or territories of
Canada for at least twelve months and that have equity securities 104 that
trade on a Canadian stock exchange with an aggregate, market value in
excess of C$75 million are eligible to participate in an expedited review
process.105 Qualified issuers are assigned a designated jurisdiction that acts
as that issuer's "principal jurisdiction" for purposes of the review. As under
National Policy No. 1, qualified issuers file their preliminary prospectus,
together with the supporting material listed in National Policy No. 1,
contemporaneously with the designated jurisdiction and the securities
commission of each province in which it is proposing to qualify the
offering. Immediately upon receipt of such materials, the designated juris-
diction will issue a preliminary expedited review receipt evidencing that a
preliminary receipt has been issued by each jurisdiction in which the pre-
liminary prospectus was filed. Thereafter, the designated jurisdiction will
review the materials and will use its best efforts to issue its written
comments within only three working days. Once the designated jurisdiction
is satisfied that all comments have been resolved and a final prospectus,
together with supporting documents, has been filed the designated jurisdic-
103 The term "reporting issuer" is defined in § 1(1) of the OSA and generally refers to a company
that has filed a prospectus and obtained a receipt therefore, filed a securities exchange take-over bid
circular, has securities listed and posted for trading on a Canadian stock exchange, or is, pursuant to the
provisions of the company's particular incorporaiing statute, a company that is offering its securities to the
public.
104 Securities that carry a residual right to participate in earnings of the issuer and, upon liquidation
or winding up of the issuer, in its assets.
105 The expedited review procedure is set out in the Memorandum of Understanding for Expedited
Review of Short Form Prospectuses and Renewal AIFs, 17 O.S.C.B. 5212 (Nov. 4, 1994), among the
various provinces and territories of Canada except Quebec. While Quebec is the only jurisdiction that is
not a party to the Memorandum of Understanding, the Commission des valeurs mobili~res du Quibec,
Qudbec's securities commission, has agreed to attempt to review materials filed under the procedure for
expedited review within the time periods prescribed by the Memorandum of Understanding. An issuer
intending to qualify an offering in more than one Canadian jurisdiction and Qubec may nonetheless
participate in the expedited review process and file under National Policy Statement No. I provided it
selects its designated jurisdiction under expedited review as its principal jurisdiction for the purposes of
National Policy Statement No. 1.
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tion will issue a final expedited review receipt evidencing that a final receipt
has been issued by each jurisdiction in which the preliminary prospectus
was filed.
III. WORLD-CLASS FOREIGN ISSUERS
In August of 1993, the Canadian Security Administrators circulated
for comment Draft National Policy Statement No. 53-Foreign Issuer
Prospectus and Continuous Disclosure System. The intended purpose of
Draft National Policy Statement No. 53 is to reduce barriers to entry to the
Canadian capital markets for "world-class" foreign issuers who are access-
ing the U.S. public markets, provide increased opportunity for Canadian
dealers to participate in offerings by foreign issuers and provide increased
opportunity for investment by Canadian investors in the securities of these
issuers while maintaining an appropriate level of investor protection.
In order to be considered a "world-class" issuer, the Draft Policy
requires that the issuer have both a market capitalization of C$3 billion and
a public float of C$1 billion after giving effect to the offering. Moreover,
the Draft Policy provides that the Canadian tranche must be limited to ten
percent of the offering and the issuer must have less than ten percent of its
equity securities held by Canadian residents. Although originally broader in
scope, recent pronouncements from the OSC indicate that qualified world-
class foreign issuers who access the U.S. public markets will be enabled to
take advantage of the Multi-Jurisdictional Disclosure System (the "MJDS")
and use their U.S. registration statement to sell their securities into Canada.
The prospectus used by the world-class foreign issuer in Canada is
receipted as a prospectus and therefore must comply with the requirement of
"full, true and plain disclosure of all material facts." Accordingly, the civil
liability provisions of applicable Canadian legislation will continue to apply
to the issuer in connection with its disclosure document.
As to ongoing reporting issuer obligations, generally speaking,
world-class foreign issuers which have offered securities under Draft
National Policy Statement No. 53 may comply with the continuous financial
and other reporting requirements of the U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission in lieu of those of the Canadian securities regulators.
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IV. EXEMPT PRIVATE PLACEMENTS
There are, essentially, four categories of prospectus exempt securities
transactions or "private placements."1 06 The first involves the distribution
of certain securities that are considered inherently "safe," such as govern-
ment or bank guaranteed bonds and guaranteed investment certificates
issued by licensed loan and trust corporations. 107 In addition, no prospectus
is required for securities that are traded upon a "recognized stock
exchange," i.e., The Toronto Stock Exchange and The Montreal Exchange,
where the securities are distributed through the facilities and pursuant to the
rules of that stock exchange and the applicable provincial or territorial
securities commission. 108
The second category of exempt private placements focuses upon the
purchaser of the securities rather than upon the securities distributed. There
are, broadly speaking, two types of exempt purchasers; the first are consid-
ered "sophisticated" purchasers, who (it is assumed) will take appropriate
precautions in respect of their investment decision, such as government
purchasers] 09 or purchasers who purchase as principal a security the acqui-
sition cost of which is not less than C$150,000. o10 The other class of
exempt purchasers are persons who have a sufficient nexus to the issuer
such that they possess or have ready access to the information they require
to assess the proposed investment, such as employees of the issuer
(provided that such employees are not induced to purchase by way of
expectation of employment or continued employment)"' and existing
security holders, when the securities are distributed by way of dividends in
specie. 112
The third category of private placement involve trades in securities in
which purchasers are given an acceptable alternate source of information
from the prospectus. Such transactions include securities exchanged pursu-
106 Reference should be made to §§ 72, 73, and 74 of the OSA, §§ 14 and 17 of the OSA
Regulation, and the corresponding sections of the various other provincial and territorial securities acts and
the regulations thereto for a comprehensive description of available exemptions from the prospectus
requirements of each.
107 OSA, R.S.O. § 73 (1990).
108 Id
109 Id § 72(lXa).
110 Id § 72(lXd); OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 27(1) (1990).
III OSA, R.S.O. § 72(lXn) (1990).
112 Id §72(l)(g).
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ant to a take-over bid in respect of which shareholders are given a take-over
bid circular"l 3 or pursuant to a statutory amalgamation or arrangement in
respect of which shareholders are given an information circular. 114
An issuer desiring to take advantage of the C$150,000 private place-
ment prospectus exemption in circumstances where solicitations are made
through an advertisement in printed media of general and regular paid circu-
lation, radio or television, must provide prospective purchasers with an
"offering memorandum." 15 There are no rules specifying the content of an
offering memorandum. Essentially, a document is an "offering memoran-
dum" if it purports to describe the business and affairs of an issuer and has
been prepared primarily for delivery to and review by prospective investors
so as to assist them in their investment decision in respect of the securities
being sold. 1 6  An offering memorandum must, however, contain a
"contractual right of action" stating that investors have a right of action
against the issuer for rescission or damages that is exercisable within 90
days after payment in the event that the offering memorandum contains a
"misrepresentation." 117  The contractual right of action must reasonably
correspond to the rights provided by statute applicable to a purchaser under
a prospectus and may be subject to the defense that the issuer is not liable if
it proves that the purchaser acquired the securities with knowledge of the
misrepresentation." 8 If an issuer voluntarily provides prospective purchas-
ers with an offering memorandum certain prospectus exemptions will not be
available to the issuer unless the prospective investor is also given a
contractual right of action described in the offering memorandum."l 9
The final category of exemption from the prospectus requirements, is
a discretionary one. Unlike in the United States, securities regulators in
Canada have the power to exempt issuers from the prospectus requirements
where they are "satisfied to do so would not be prejudicial to the public
interest, upon such terms and conditions as they may consider to be neces-
113 id § 72(lXk).
114 Id. § 72(l)(i).
115 OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 32(2) (1990).
116 Id § 32.
117 Id
118 Id
119 Issuers who intend to rely on the prospectus exemptions found at OSA, R.S.O. §§ 72(1)(c), (d)
or (p) or at OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 14(f) and who voluntarily provide prospective purchasers with an
offering memorandum must provide purchasers with the contractual right of action. OSA Regulation,
R.R.O. § 32(3)
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sary."120  The OSC Blanket Ruling concerning Certain International
Offerings By Private Placement In Ontario'21 is an example of such
discretionary power.
The OSC Blanket Ruling allows foreign issuers which are not incor-
porated or organized under the laws of Canada or a province or territory
thereof, not controlled by Canadians and whose assets and operations are
not principally located or administered in Canada to make a private place-
ment in Ontario to (i) persons, other than individuals, who are recognized
by the OSC as an exempt purchaser, and (ii) persons purchasing securities
the aggregate acquisition cost of which are at least C$150,000; provided
that the foreign issuer file with the OSC either a U.S. prospectus or offering
memorandum if the offering is being made concurrently in the United States
or a U.K. prospectus if the offering is being made concurrently in the United
Kingdom. In either event, the foreign disclosure document need not contain
the "contractual rights of action" for rescission or damages against the
foreign issuer which would otherwise be required.
In summary, a company may distribute securities in Canada by a
public offering, by filing a prospectus with the applicable securities admin-
istrators in the jurisdictions in which it proposes to distribute the securities,
or by a "private placement" pursuant to one or more of the exemptions from
prospectus qualification requirements.
V. STOCK EXCHANGE REQUIREMENTS
Stock exchanges in Canada are self-regulating organizations with
their own rules, regulations, and by-laws, 122 but are ultimately subject to the
oversight of the securities commission of the jurisdiction in which they are
located. 123
The principal exchange through the facilities of which securities of
mature issuers are traded is The Toronto Stock Exchange, with The
Montreal Exchange providing strong competition. Speculative and junior
corporations are more often traded through the facilities of the Vancouver
Stock Exchange and to a lesser extent through the facilities of the Alberta
120 OSA, R.S.O. § 74 (1990).
121 Supra note 65.
122 OSA, R.S.O. § 20 (1990).
123 Id §23.
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Stock Exchange. Each exchange has its own listing requirements, rules, by-
laws and policies.
Section 324 of The Toronto Stock Exchange Company Manual
provides the minimum listing requirements for a foreign company, and
requires that the foreign company have net tangible assets of at least C$10
million and a minimum of 1 million issued shares held by at least 3,000
public shareholders having a minimum market value of C$10 million.
Additionally, if the foreign company is not listed on a recognized "major
stock exchange," The Toronto Stock Exchange requires that there be at least
300 public shareholders each holding a board lot or more who are residents
of Canada. To list on the International Division of The Montreal Exchange,
a foreign company must have net tangible assets of at least C$15 million,
pre-tax income of at least C$2.5 million and a minimum of 100 issued
shares held by at least 1,000 public shareholders having a minimum market
value of C$25 million.1 24 French companies that are reporting issuers in
Qudbec only because certain of their securities are listed on the
International Division of The Montreal Exchange and that are not reporting
issuers in any other province of Canada or subject to United States securi-
ties regulations are eligible to participate in a simplified continuous
disclosure regime. 1
25
The Toronto Stock Exchange may at any time temporarily halt
trading in any securities or suspend from trading or delist a company's
securities if it is satisfied that the company has failed to comply with any of
the provisions of its Listing Agreement or such action is necessary in the
public interest.
VI. DiSCLOSURE AND REPORTING OBLIGATIONS OF A PUBLIC COMPANY IN
CANADA
Public companies in Canada are subject to a myriad of continuous
disclosure and reporting obligations outlined in Appendix B, including
124 The Charter of the Montreal Stock Exchange, Rule 9, art. 9904, 4200-16.
125 Commission des valeurs mobilires du Quebec, Policy Statement No. Q-16, exempts eligible
foreign companies from the requirement to communicate directly with shareholder resident in Quebec
provided that it designate a person who also has a place of business in Qudbec and from whom
shareholders may review and obtain such shareholder communications. The simplified continuous
disclosure regime provided by Policy Statement No. Q-16 does not, however, exempt the reporting issuer
from its filing requirements with the Commission des valeurs mobiliires du Quebec.
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annual and interim financial reporting, 126 timely disclosure, 12 7 proxy solici-
tation, 128 and insider reporting obligations.129  Such continuous disclosure
and reporting obligations apply to all public companies, unless specifically
exempted, regardless of whether their securities are listed for trading on a
Canadian stock exchange.
VII. SANCTIONS
As in many countries, fraud, manipulation, and insider trading are
sanctioned under Canadian law, by
(1) the criminal law enacted by the federal government and
applicable in all jurisdictions in Canada;
(2) the securities and company law quasi-criminal prohibitions; and
(3) the existence of civil remedies under securities, company and
common law.
The provisions of the federal criminal law pertaining to fraud are found in
Part VIII of the Criminal Code.130 Section 338 of the Criminal Code is the
"general" fraud section. Fraudulent use of the mails as penalized by section
339 includes schemes "devised or intended" to achieve any one of the three
stated purposes: to deceive the public, to defraud the public, or to obtain
126 OSA, R.S.O. §§ 78-79 (1990); OSA Regulation, R.R.O. §§ 7-11 (1990).
127 OSA, R.S.O. §§ 75-76 (1990) require reporting issuers to issue a press release and file it,
together with a report on a prescribed form, of all "material changes" that occur in their affairs. The term
"material change," where used in relation to the affairs of an issuer, is defined at OSA, R.S.O. § 1(1)
(1990) to mean a change in the business, operations, or capital of the issuer that would reasonably be
expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of any of the securities of the issuer and
includes the decision to implement such a change made by the board of directors of the issuer or by senior
management of the issuer who believe that confirmation of the decision by the board of directors is
probable.
129 OSA, R.S.O. part XIX (1990).
129 Id part XXI. Insiders of public companies are required to file and update a report with the
applicable securities commission reflecting their beneficial ownership and trading activity of the securities
of the companies in respect of which they are "insiders." An "insider" is defined as every director or
senior officer of a reporting issuer or of a company that is itself an insider or subsidiary of a reporting
issuer, any person or company who beneficially owns voting securities of a reporting issuer, or who
exercises control or direction over such securities carrying more than ten percent of the voting rights
attached to all voting securities of the reporting issuer then outstanding and a reporting issuer where it has
purchased, redeemed or otherwise acquired any of its securities, for so long as it holds any of its securities.
OSA, R.S.O. § I(1) (1990).130 R.S.C. ch. C-46 (1985).
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money under false pretenses. These two sections may be used to attempt to
control fraudulent behavior relating to securities or other matters. It should
be observed that it is not necessary that there be an ascertained victim. In
addition, section 340 subjects to criminal sanctions the activity or conduct
commonly called "wash trading" which is a technique designed to manipu-
late a market by giving the appearance of investor activity and interest.
Securities law offenses are specified in the various securities statutes,
which provide that "persons" or "companies" that
(1) make false statements in materials required to be filed or
disseminated pursuant to the securities law; or
(2) contravene any provisions of the securities law, including those
contained in the regulations under the statutes; or
(3) fail to comply with directions, decisions and rulings of the
securities administrators are guilty of offenses with fines ranging
up to $1,000,000 or to imprisonment for a term of not more than
two years, or to both. 13 1
In addition to the quasi-criminal connotation of a conviction for a securities
offense, most Canadian statutes grant to the securities administrators the
power to remove the exemptions from trading, whether by way of registra-
tion of "securities" or registration of traders, from persons whose conduct is
"unbecoming," i.e., the administrators are given discretion to remove the
ability to use the exemptions where in their opinion it is "in the public
interest so to do."]32 Further, the relevant commission retains the power to
order that all "trading" in particular "securities" cease "where in its opinion
such action is in the public interest." 133
Civil liability is specified in the various securities statutes in terms
not dissimilar to those specified in Part XXII of the OSA. Damages are
131 OSA, R.S.O. § 122 (1990). Since December of 1990, 14 individuals have received jail
sentences for violations of the OSA. Prior to 1990, it appears that only 12 prosecutions under the OSA
resulted in jail sentences in more than 40 years. It would also appear that there are only two decisions, R.
v. Kushnyrick (unreported) (Alberta P.C. May 14, 199 1) and R. v. Bachewick (unreported) (Manitoba P.C.
June 15, 1994), involving the imposition of a jail sentence for a provincial securities violation outside of
Ontario, despite the fact that it is a penalty which is available in every province except Quebec. David E.
Lang, Emerging Trend Toward Jail Sentences for Securities Act Violations in Ontario, 18 O.S.C.B. 346
(Jan. 27, 1995).
132 OSA, R.S.O. § 128 (1990).
133 Id § 127.
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specified for a "misrepresentation" in a prospectus, take-over bid circular,
and directors' circular issued pursuant to the take-over bid requirements. It
is a specified defense that no "person" or "company" is liable for a misrep-
resentation in a prospectus, if the accused or respondent proves that the
purchaser purchased the security with knowledge of the
"misrepresentation." Also, due diligence defenses are specified by most
statutory provisions, where the defendant can establish that he conducted
"reasonable investigation" to provide "reasonable grounds" for believing
that there had been no "misrepresentation." Damages are limited to those
that relate directly to the depreciation in the value of the "security"
concerned only to the extent such depreciation is attributable to the
"misrepresentation" concerned.
Additional civil remedies are those available under the common law,
including actions for damages, fraud, or deceit. Recourse to such remedies
is rarely made as affected security holders would, in certain circumstances,
have to prove reliance on an alleged "misrepresentation" in a prospectus or
take-over bid circular whereas they are statutorily "deemed to have relied on
the misrepresentation" under Canadian securities law. 134 As well, the
securities laws provide that no agreement of purchase and sale is binding if
a prospectus has not been delivered.
134 Id §§ 130(1), 131(1).
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Appendix B outlines the disclosure and reporting obligations of a
foreign public company in Canada as they arise under the Securities Act
(Ontario) (the "OSA"), the policies of the Ontario Securities Commission
(the "OSC"), National Policy Statements, and the rules and by-laws of The
Toronto Stock Exchange (the "TSE") as to December 31, 1994. For the
purposes of this memorandum, the corporate and other foreign securities
regime applicable to any particular foreign issuer has not been considered
except with respect to the applicability of OSC Policy 7.1 and National
Policy 14 as discussed below.
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Broadly speaking, OSC Policy 7.1 allows public companies, other
than those incorporated, organized, or continued under the laws of Canada,
or a province or territory thereof, registered with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (the "SEC") in the United States under the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 to comply with the annual and interim
financial reporting, timely disclosure, management information circular, and
insider reporting obligations of the SEC provided that copies of all such
reports are filed within prescribed time periods with the OSC. OSC Policy
7.1 is augmented by National Policy 14 which allows a public company to
disclose financial information in a currency other than Canadian dollars
provided that the currency of display is reasonable in the circumstances
(e.g., the currency of the jurisdiction in which the public company is organ-
ized or incorporated, or the currency of the public company's primary
economic environment).
11. DISCLOSURE
The disclosure requirements applicable to public companies in
Ontario are discussed below. It should be noted that some provinces have
securities legislation with different requirements from those of Ontario.
A. Financial Statements
Generally, financial statements must be prepared in accordance with
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants Handbook 35 and generally
accepted accounting principles. Where the CICA Handbook is silent, the
required accounting practice would be found in general industry practice or
from pronouncements of other major accounting bodies, principally in the
United States and England. However, where the public company is incor-
porated or organized in a jurisdiction other than Canada or a province or
territory thereof, "generally accepted accounting principles" may, at the
option of the public company, mean such principles as prescribed in the
incorporating jurisdiction by an association in that jurisdiction equivalent to
the Canadian Institute of Chartered Accountants; provided that disclosure to
such effect is made in the notes to the financial statements. 136
135 Id. § 78; OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 1(3) (1990); TSE Company Manual § 439.
136 OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 1(4)(1990).
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1. Annual
The TSE requires the public companies to send the annual financial
statements and an annual report containing a record of the public company's
activities, if any, during the period covered to each shareholder within 140
days after the end of the financial year, and to file four copies of these
materials with the TSE concurrently with the sending of these materials to
the shareholders. 137 The financial statements which must be accompanied
by an auditor's report, include a balance sheet, statement of retained earn-
ings, income statement, and a statement of changes in financial position.138
The annual financial statements must also be filed with the OSC and sent to




Unless an exempting order has been obtained, public companies are
required to file with the OSC and send to shareholders resident in Ontario
unaudited interim financial statements, comprised of a statement of changes
in financial position and an income statement, for each of three quarterly
periods of each fiscal year, within sixty days of the end of that period.140
Comparative financial statements for the corresponding period in the
previous year must also be filed. 14 1 These statements need not be accom-
panied by an auditor's report. 142 Four copies must be forwarded to the
TSE. 143 The interim financial statements must be sent to the shareholders
within sixty days of the date to which they are made up.144
3. AIF and MD&A
OSC Policy Statement 5.10 requires public companies to prepare an
annual information form ("AIF") on the business and operations of the
137 TSE Company Manual § 437.
138 OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 10 (1990).
139 OSA, R.S.O. §§ 78-79 (1990).
140 Id. §§ 77, 79; OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 7 (1990).
141 OSA, R.S.O. § 77 (1990).
142 OSA Regulation, R.S.O. § 9 (1990).
143 TSE Company Manual § 436.
144 OSA, R.S.O. § 79 (1990).
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public company and to prepare a management discussion and analysis
("MD&A") of the current financial situation and future prospects of the
public company. The primary objective of Policy 5.10 is to enhance inves-
tor understanding of the public company's business by providing
supplemental analysis and background material to allow fuller understand-
ing of the nature of the public company, its operations, and known prospects
for the future.
The AIF must be filed with the OSC (with four copies to the TSE)
within 140 days of the fiscal year end. The AIF must also be made avail-
able to any security holder on request and any other person on request upon
payment of a reasonable fee set by the public company. The MD&A must
accompany the annual financial statements. There is no requirement for
interim financial statements to include MD&A, but the OSC encourages
such inclusion of MD&A.
4. Exemptions
The OSC may permit the omission of the comparative financial
statements for particular periods of time, the sales or gross revenue figures
(if disclosure would be detrimental to the public company), or basic earn-
ings per share or fully diluted earnings per share, 145 where to do so would
not be prejudicial to the public interest. Given the importance of the annual
financial statements to investor protection, the OSC will not normally grant
full relief from these requirements.146 The OSC may also allow exemptions
where the public company uses another form of reporting or if there is
adequate justification for exempting the public company.147 If the interim
financial statements are not of significant benefit to the investors and are a
material financial burden to the public company, the OSC may fully or
partly exempt the public company from preparing them.148 Since the
statements are for shareholder benefit, the OSC generally requires share-
holder approval. Alternative methods of distribution of the interim financial
statements may be used if the quality and effectiveness of distribution meets
with the OSC's approval.
145 Id § 80(a).
146 OSC Policy 7.1, reprinted in OSA and Regulations 1995 at 981-93.
147 OSC Policy 7.1, pt. C, reprinted in OSA and Regulations 1995 at 985.
148 OSC Policy 2.6, reprinted in OSA and Regulations 1995 at 836-39.
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B. Timely Disclosure
To place all investors on an equal footing with respect to access to
material information about a public company, timely disclosure obligations
are imposed on every public company.149 To become a public company
under the OSA, a company must place all material facts on public record
through the issuance of a prospectus and the TSE listing statement. New
and material information concerning the public company may thereafter
arise as a result of a material change in the affairs of the public company.150
Such material change must be disclosed on a timely basis.
For the purposes of securities legislation, a "material change" is a
change in the business, operations, or capital of the public company that
would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market
price or value of any of its securities. A "material change" includes a
decision to implement such change that is made by the board of directors or
senior management of the public company if they believe the confirmation
of the decision by the board of directors is probable.
"Forthwith" after a material change, a public company must issue a
press release authorized by a senior officer disclosing the nature and sub-
stance of the change and must file a copy with the OSC. The public
company must also file with the OSC, and with such other securities regula-
149 OSA, R.S.O. § 75 (1990). National Policy No. 40, reprinted in OSA and Regulations 1995 at
624-31.
150 A "material change" is a change in the business, operations, or capital of the company that
would reasonably be expected to have a significant effect on the market price or value of any of the
company's securities and includes a decision to implement such change made by the board of directors of
the company or by senior management of the company who believe that confirmation of the decision by
the board of directors is probable. The national security administrators have indicated that actual or
proposed developments that are likely to give rise to material information, and thus to require prompt
disclosure, include, but are not limited to, the following:
changes in share ownership that may effect control
changes in corporate structure such as reorganizations, amalgamations
* take-over bids or issuer bids
* major corporate acquisitions or dispositions
* changes in capital structure
* significant borrowings
* issuances of securities publicly or privately
development of new products or resources
* significant contracts
* changes in strategy
* significant changes in management
* major labor disputes
events of default under financing or other agreements.
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tory authorities of provinces in which the public company is a reporting
issuer, a material change report (Form 27) disclosing the change as soon as
practicable and, in any event, within ten days of the change. The OSC (and
other relevant authorities) may relieve the public company from the
requirement to issue a press release if the disclosure would be unduly detri-
mental to the public company or the material change consists of a decision
to implement the change by senior management who have no reason to
believe that persons with knowledge of the change have made use of it in
purchasing or selling securities of the public company. The public company
must still file a Form 27, but it can be marked "confidential" and must be
filed together with written reasons for the non-disclosure. The OSC and the
TSE will monitor trading in the issuer's securities in the market, and the
public company must report to the OSC (and other relevant authorities)
every ten days, outlining the reasons why confidentiality is still required.
This mechanism will continue until the public company is ready to make
disclosure or the OSC or another securities authority compels disclosure.151
The OSC may exempt from the timely disclosure requirements public
companies with less than fifteen Ontario resident security holders, if this
would not be prejudicial to the public interest.] 52
National Policy No. 40 supplements the requirements of the
Securities Act (Ontario) by requiring disclosure of material information,
which includes material facts. Actual or proposed developments that are
likely to give rise to material information and thus to require prompt
disclosure include, but are not limited to, the following:
(1) changes in share ownership that may affect control of the issuer;
(2) changes in corporate structure, such as reorganizations,
amalgamations etc.;
(3) take-over bids or issuer bids;
(4) major corporate acquisitions or dispositions;
(5) changes in capital structure;
(6) ordering of a significant amount of funds;
(7) public or private sale of additional securities;
(8) development of new products and developments affecting the
issuer's resources, technology, products or market;
151 OSA, R.S.O. §§ 75(3)-75(4) (1990).
152 Id. § 83.
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(9) significant discoveries by resource companies;
(10) entering into or loss of significant contracts;
(11) firm evidence of significant increases or decreases in near-term
earnings prospects;
(12) changes in capital investment plans or corporate objectives;
(13) significant changes in management;
(14) significant litigation;
(15)major labor disputes or disputes with major contractors or
suppliers;
(16) events of default under financing or other agreements; or
(17) any other developments relating to the business and affairs of the
issuer that would reasonably be expected to significantly affect
the market price or value of any of the issuer's securities or that
would reasonably be expected to have a significant influence on
a reasonable investor's investment decision.
The TSE153 requires listed companies to make timely disclosure of all
material information concerning the business and affairs of the public
company including changes in control, the acquisition or dispositions of
significant assets, reorganizations, amalgamations and take-overs, develop-
ment of new products, material contracts, changes in the capital structure,
firm evidence of significant changes in near-term earning prospects, and any
other change that is expected to significantly affect the market price of the
securities.' 54 Such changes should be disclosed promptly to the TSE and
the general public using a media service (such as Canada News-Wire) and
rumors known to the public company should also be promptly clarified. For
ease and speed of processing, separate notices for each event should be sent
to the TSE.155
The timing of public disclosure of material information is a very
difficult issue. Premature public disclosure may cause a public company as
much difficulty as delayed disclosure or failure to disclose at all. A public
announcement by an issuer that it intends to proceed with a particular trans-
action implies a present willingness and ability to carry out that intent; if the
153 TSE Company Manual § 406. The TSE's timely disclosure requirements are extended to all
public companies or the equivalent in any Canadian jurisdiction by draft National Policy No. 40 of the
Canadian Securities Administrators.
154 Id. §§ 409-410.
155 Id. § 433.
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party making the announcement is not in a position to proceed with the
change within a short period of time, the OSC will consider the making of
the announcement to be premature and misleading. 156
How can a public company best organize itself to deal with the timely
disclosure obligations? Forward planning would not be of assistance for
example, if a major plant of a public company bums down. However, a
public company can structure its strategic decision-making process to
prevent triggering a public disclosure requirement prematurely, when for
example, a significant acquisition is made. To do this management should
identify proposed transactions which would appear to constitute material
changes. If management is in any doubt as to whether the transaction would
have a significant effect on the market price of the issuer's securities, one or
more investment dealers should be consulted together with legal counsel.
Management should also avoid making decisions to implement significant
changes without prior consultation with the board of directors. After
hearing management's specific recommendations regarding a particular
course of action, the board should make the final decision.
Finally, management must attempt to prevent knowledge of the
proposed change from spreading within the public company. Those who
need to know must understand their duty to keep this information confiden-
tial and not to buy or sell in the public company's securities on the basis of
it. The implications of breaching this duty are discussed under "Insider
Trading" below. It is a good idea for management to notify each director in
writing when the occurrence of a material change is possible, warning the
director to avoid buying or selling in the market.
In order for the TSE to have up-to-date information on certain basic
aspects of all listed companies, annual questionnaires must be filed. 157
These questionnaires cover basic corporate information such as head office
location, the names of officers, directors and transfer agent(s), capital
structure, fiscal year-end date, and publication of financial statements.
The TSE also requires notification of the declaration by the board of
any dividends forthwith upon declaration and, in any event, at least seven
trading days in advance of the dividend record date.158 Notification may be
made by phone and confirmed by letter, or by press release with copies sent
156 Premature Announcements of Takeover Bids, Mergers, Amalgamations or Other Corporate
Restructuring, OSC BULLETIN, Oct. 1980, at 450.
157 TSE Company Manual §§ 424-427.
158 Id §§ 428-435.
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to the TSE. Failure to notify the TSE at least four business days before the
record date will result in the TSE holding the public company liable to all
parties with bona fide disputes over entitlement to the dividend. The notice
must be published, and must contain the public company's name, stock
issue, rate of dividend, date payable, record date, and the-dividend period.
All listed companies must give immediate notice to the TSE of any
proposed issuance of equity securities or options, and must not proceed with
the transaction without the TSE's prior consent.159 As a condition of such
consent, the TSE may require shareholder approval if the proposed transac-
tion may materially affect control of the public company or has not been
negotiated at arm's length, or if such approval is desirable, having regard to
the interests of shareholders and the investing public.1
60
Options granted pursuant to the public company's stock option plan
(the "Plan") must be reported to the TSE at the time of the grant, but do not
require prior acceptance by the TSE. Any material amendment to the Plan,
or to the terms of an option granted thereunder, must be approved by the
TSE and shareholder approval will be required.161
Additionally, by January 30 of each year, the public company must
file a notice with the Ontario Securities Commission (the "OSC") stating the
aggregate proceeds realized in Ontario from the public company's Director,
Officer and Employee Stock Option Plan in the previous year. The public
company must notify the OSC by January 30 of the aggregate proceeds
from the issuance of securities under the plan since the last notice filed.
Together with the notice, the public company must pay a fee equal to 0.02%
of the aggregate gross proceeds stated in the notice. This requirement will
be applicable only for a year in which shares are issued under the plan. 1
62
III. INSIDER TRADING AND REPORTING
A. Insiders
Corporate legislation is designed to prevent insiders of public companies
and their associates from using confidential information-not generally
known to the public-to make a profit, and hence to protect investors and
159 TSE By-law 19.06(l); TSE Company Manual §§ 601-605.
160 TSE By-law 19.06(2); TSE Company Manual §§ 606-608.
161 TSE Company Manual §§ 626-632.
162 OSA Regulation, R.R.O. Sched. 1, § 20 (1990).
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maintain public confidence in the market place. To accomplish this, the
legislation uses two mechanisms. First, anyone who becomes an insider of
a public company must file an initial report disclosing the insider's interest
in the public company's securities, and must file insider change reports
when this interest changes. Second, an insider and his associates are
prohibited from trading in the public company's securities with information
that has not been generally disclosed to the public or disclosing such infor-
mation outside the necessary course of business. Insiders include the
directors and senior officers of the public company and its subsidiaries and
insiders. Companies or persons who exercise control of more than ten
percent of the votes attached to all voting securities are also insiders. 163
B. Insider Reporting
The OSA requires that'a person or company who becomes an insider
of a public company must file a report (Form 36) disclosing any direct or
indirect beneficial ownership, control, or direction over securities of that
public company. 164 This report must be filed within ten days after the end
of the month in which that person or company becomes an insider with the
OSC and, if applicable, to its equivalent in the provinces of Manitoba,
Newfoundland and Nova Scotia, and within ten days from the date upon
which that person or company becomes an insider with the securities
commission of each of Alberta, British Columbia, Qu6bec, and
Saskatchewan, if applicable.
Insiders must also file Insider Reports disclosing any changes in their
direct or indirect beneficial ownership or control or direction over the
securities of the public company within ten days after the end of the month
of such change with the securities commission of Ontario and, if applicable,
of each of British Columbia, Qu6bec, Manitoba, Newfoundland, and Nova
Scotia and within ten days of such change with the securities commission of
each of Alberta and Saskatchewan, if applicable. 165 Provinces that require
filing of insider trading reports permit filing of a uniform report.
An insider without any direct or indirect beneficial ownership, control
or direction over securities of the public company is not required to file
163 OSA, R.S.0. § 1(1) (1990).
164 Id § 107(l).
165 Id § 102.
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these reports with the OSC and its equivalent in Alberta, Manitoba, and
Saskatchewan, but must file a "Nil" report with the securities commission
of British Columbia, Quebec, Newfoundland, and Nova Scotia, if subject to
the authority of the securities regulatory authorities of such jurisdictions. 166
The acquisition or disposition of a put, call, or other transferable option is
deemed to be a change in the beneficial ownership of the security and must
be included in the insider report. 167
Where a public company itself becomes an insider, every director and
senior officer of that public company (but not the public company itself) is
deemed to have been an insider for the previous six months. 168 "Senior
officer" is defined as the chairman and/or vice-chairman of the board of
directors, the president, vice-president, secretary, treasurer, and general
manager of the public company and any other individual that performs
similar functions, as well as the five highest paid employees of the public
company including any of the officers specifically mentioned.169 During
the period of time that a public company contemplates becoming an insider
of another public company, the directors and officers of the former
company may obtain access to information about the public company in the
course of discussions prior to the actual sale. Thus if a person has become
an insider in this manner, he must include in his insider report all direct or
indirect beneficial ownership, control or direction over securities of the
public company for the previous six months. 170
An insider may not transfer any securities into the name of an agent,
nominee or custodian without informing the OSC and other securities regu-
latory authorities to which the public company is subject within ten days. 171
This reporting requirement also extends to securities that are registered in
the name of a person or company but are beneficially owned by an insider
and the registered holder is aware that beneficial owner is an insider. 172 In
both instances, however, a transfer for the purpose of giving collateral for a
bonafide debt is exempt from the reporting requirements.
166 OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 166 (1990).
167 OSA, R.S.O. § 106(2)(b)(1990).
169 Id § 1(8).
169 Id. § I(1X41).
170 Id § 107(3).
171 Id § 108; OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 167 (1990).
172 OSA, R.S.O. § 109 (1990); OSA Regulation, R.R.O. § 168 (1990).
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On application by any interested person or company, the OSC may
grant an exemption from the insider reporting requirements.173 An exemp-
tion is normally granted for directors and senior officers of insider
companies where these companies do not control the public company of
which they are insiders, individually or in concert with others, and do not
provide that public company or its majOr subsidiaries with materials or
services, the supply of which could have a significant effect on the market
price or value of its securities. 174 The exempted directors and senior
officers must not normally get information relating to material facts or
material changes prior to general disclosure.
C. Insider Trading
The insider reporting requirement provides the investing public with
information about who the insiders are and when their trades are being
made. There is a wider group, however, who may have access to inside
information.
This group comprises persons or companies in a "special relation-
ship" with a public company, and is defined to include:
" insiders, affiliates and associates of the public company, any
offerors proposing to make a take-over bid for the public
company, and anyone proposing to become a party to a business
combination with the public company or to acquire a substantial
portion of its property;
" anyone engaging in or proposing to engage in any business or
professional activity with the public company (or a take-over bid
offeror or a party to a business combination);
" directors, officers and employees of the public company (or an
offeror or a party to business combination);
* anyone that obtained the insider information while being in any
of the above three categories;
• anyone that obtained the insider information from anyone whom
the recipient knew or ought reasonably to have known was in a
173 OSA, R.S.O. § 121(2) (1990).
174 OSC Policy 10.1, reprinted in OSA and Regulations 1995 at 1026-27.
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special relationship with the issuer in any of the above four
categories.175
Persons in such a special relationship are prohibited from purchasing or
selling securities with the knowledge of an undisclosed material fact or
change ("insider information") with respect to the public company.176
Under the OSA, any person in a special relationship who tips inside
information to a third party, may also be liable to the seller or to the
purchaser of such securities from a third party.177 The "insider information"
must be such that, if generally known, would reasonably be expected to
affect materially the value of the security.
Liability will not arise if the relevant information was disclosed in the
necessary course of business, or if the informer proves that he reasonably
believed the "insider information" had been generally disclosed.178
D. Sanctions
There are substantial statutory penalties for persons or companies
where there has been a breach of the legislation or where required
documents or notices contain misrepresentations.
These penalties include fines up to C$1,000,000 (or triple any profit
made by such contravention, whichever the greater), and prison terms of up
to two years. 179 An order may also be made to force compliance with the
legislation.180 Where a public company is found to be in breach of the
relevant statutory provisions, the directors and officers who authorized,
permitted, or acquiesced in the offense are also held to be guilty and may be
liable to the same penalties as the public company. 18'
The OSC has the power, where it believes this to be in the public
interest, to order trading to cease with respect to any securities of a public
company and to impose terms and conditions on such a cease trading
'75 OSA, R.S.O. § 76(5) (1990).
176 Id § 76(1).
177 Id § 134.
179 Id § 76(4).
179 Id §§ 122(1), 122(4).
ISO Id § 126; O.B.C.A. § 253.
18I OSA, R.S.O. § 122(3) (1990).
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order.18 2 A hearing is mandatory before suspension, unless the delay would
be prejudicial to the public interest.
The TSE has no rules or policies with respect to insider trading, but
advises that all listed companies should have an internal rule prohibiting
such trading. 183 The TSE, however, may temporarily halt trading in any
listed securities or suspend from trading or delist a public company's
securities if it is satisfied that the public company has failed to comply with
its Listing Agreement or if such action is in the public interest. 184 A halt in
trading should not always be seen as a penalty; this is a temporary measure
which usually does not last more than a few hours (or one or two days at
most), and may be used to give a public company the opportunity to comply
with the TSE's disclosure policies. If suspension or delisting has been
imposed, the public company may ask for a hearing within ten days of
notice of the penalty.
In addition to specific statutory sanctions, any applicable common
law right of action for breach of a statutory duty is available. This tort
requires that the duty be owed to the plaintiff, that the injury is of a nature
that the statute is intended to prevent, and that the breach of the duty must
have caused the damage. For example, the statutory requirement to provide
a proxy information circular is for the benefit of shareholders to protect
them from the harm suffered by not having access to certain information.
Although statutory penalties are provided for breach of this requirement, the
shareholders also have rights enforceable by a common law action.18 5
The OSA provides that the liability for misrepresentation in a
prospectus or information circular is in addition to and without derogation
from any other right the investor may have at law.186 Whether breaches of
other OSA requirements give rise to a civil cause of action depends on the
circumstances. The courts will consider the intent of the legislation and, in
particular, whether or not the statute was passed for the benefit of an ascer-
tainable class of persons, whether the penalty imposed by statute is
sufficient given the nature of the breach, and whether the existing common
law remedies are adequate.
182 Id § 127.
183 TSE Company Manual § 423.4.
184 Id §701.
185 Brown v. Duby, III D.L.R. 418 (Ont. H.C. 1980).
186 OSA, R.S.O. §§ 130(10), 131(11)(1990).
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What is the proper time for insiders to trade once there has been
public disclosure of the material fact or change? Since the markets may be
slow to absorb the information, the law requires that insiders wait an appro-
priate period, which will vary according to the nature and complexity of the
information and the market for the securities. One case has held that a safe




There are two types of shareholder meetings: the regular annual
meeting and the special meeting. The TSE requires that the annual share-
holders meeting be held within six months from the end of the financial
year.188
The determination as to those shareholders entitled to vote at a share-
holders meeting, as to those shareholders entitled to receive a notice of the
shareholders meeting and the time within which such notice must be deliv-
ered is, generally speaking, prescribed not by the OSA but rather by the
legislation under which the public company has been incorporated or organ-
ized.189 However, even if the public company complies with applicable
legislation, the TSE may require a postponement of the shareholders meet-
ing if it believes investors have not had enough time to reach considered
and informed decisions. 190 Trading of the public company's securities may
also be suspended if the shareholders, in the opinion of the TSE, have not
been given adequate notice of corporate activities in which those sharehold-
ers have a right of participation.
B. Mandatory Solicitation of Proxies
A public company is required to send concurrently with or prior to
sending the notice of a shareholders meeting to the shareholders, a form of
187 In re Harold P. Connor, O.S.C.B. 149 (June 1976).
188 TSE Company Manual § 464.
189 National Policy No. 41 prescribes certain notice requirements in respect of shareholder
meetings of public companies. National Policy No. 41, reprinted in OSA and Regulations 1995 at 631-48.
190 TSE Company Manual § 459.
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proxy to each voting shareholder entitled to a notice of the meeting. 19 1 The
contents of the form of proxy are prescribed by the legislation. 192
C. Management Information Circular
Management of a public company must also send an information cir-
cular to each shareholder whose proxy is solicited and to the auditor of the
public company.193 The management information circular is intended to
provide shareholders with sufficient information to enable them to evaluate
the public company's proposed actions and to provide shareholders with
important information.
A management information circular requires considerable time and
effort to prepare. The legislation requires that the circular include, among
other matters, information about: 194
(1) the persons making the solicitation;
(2) the material interests of persons soliciting proxies in any special
business to be acted on at the meeting;
(3) the number of shares entitled to be voted and the number of votes
required to approve any matter;
(4) the nominees for election as directors, if directors are to be
elected;
(5) directors and officers remuneration;
(6) any indebtedness of directors and officers to the public company
in certain circumstances;
(7) the material interests of insiders in material transactions of the
public company;
(8) the appointment of the auditor, if an auditor is to be appointed;
(9) the details of any management agreements; and
(10) the matters to be acted upon at the meeting.
191 OSA, R.S.O. § 85 (1990), O.B.C.A. § III (1994).
192 OSA Regulation, R.R.O. §§ 177-179 (1990).
193 OSA, R.S.O. § 86 (1990). The OSA does not require a public corporation with 15 or fewer
shareholders to send a management information circular to shareholders. Id. § 86(2).
194 OSA Regulation R.R.O. § 176, Form 30 (1990).
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Any interested party may apply to the Ontario Securities Commission
for an exemption from all or part of the proxy and information circular
requirements. 196 Contemporaneous applications should be made to the
securities regulatory authorities of other provinces where the public
company is a reporting issuer. The applicant must show that there is
adequate justification for making the exemption order. Since the distribu-
tion of information circulars and proxy solicitation material is crucial to
investor protection, full exemptions will be seldom granted by the Ontario
Securities Commission. 197
E. Filing Documents
The public company must send to the Ontario Securities Commission,
and to the securities regulatory authorities to whose legislation the public
company is subject, copies of the management information circular, annual
financial statements, form of proxy, notice of meeting and any other docu-
ments for use in connection with the meeting of shareholders at the same
time such materials are sent to shareholders. 198 Every company listed on
the TSE must also file with the TSE four copies of all materials sent to its
shareholders concurrently with the sending of the materials to the
shareholder. 199
195 Id § 181.
196 OSA, R.S.O. § 88(2) (1990).
197 OSC Policy 2.6, reprinted in OSA and Regulations 1995 at 836-39.
198 OSA, R.S.O. §§ 78, 81 (1990); OSA Regulation, R.S.O. § 180 (1990).
199 TSE Manual §§ 436,437,443,456,466.
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